refactor(secrets): consumers read the store; drop materialized copies

Materializing wrote a second plaintext file per secret, which is the problem the store
was meant to solve: two files drift, and the copy is what ends up committed or grepped.

- tangled_pr / tangled_pr_edit / tangled_repo now read tangled.cookie from the store.
  engine/.tangled-session is deleted; --cookie-file remains as a legacy escape hatch.
- materialize() is replaced by run-time injection that leaves nothing at rest:
    exec-env <group> -- cmd      group as env vars (use this instead of a systemd
                                 EnvironmentFile — same effect, no plaintext on disk)
    with-file <key> -- cmd {}    0600 file in a private tmpdir, removed when cmd exits,
                                 for consumers that insist on a path (ssh -i, a TLS key)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-01 16:58:26 +00:00
co-authored by Claude
parent 6c56c1953e
commit 300e69d3b3
5 changed files with 110 additions and 67 deletions
+48 -34
View File
@@ -20,25 +20,26 @@ USAGE (CLI):
python3 engine/secrets.py get tangled.cookie # value to stdout (careful in logs)
python3 engine/secrets.py materialize <name> # write a runtime file a consumer needs
MATERIALIZED FILES: some consumers read a fixed path and cannot be taught otherwise (a
systemd EnvironmentFile, an ssh IdentityFile, `nix`'s authKeyFile). Those files still exist
on disk at 0600, but the STORE IS THE SOURCE OF TRUTH — `materialize` rewrites them from it.
Never edit a materialized file by hand; edit the store (`sops /secrets/store.yaml`) and
re-materialize, or the two silently drift.
NO SECOND COPIES. A secret must not be written to a second file "so something can read it"
copies drift from the store, get committed, and multiply what an attacker (or a careless
`grep`) can find. Consumers read the store: our own code imports this module; anything else
gets the value injected at RUN TIME and nothing is left at rest.
secrets.py exec-env cc_ci_testenv -- some-command # group as env vars, no file
secrets.py with-file ssh_keys.tangled-ed25519 -- ssh -i {} host # 0600 file in a private
# tmpdir, deleted when the command exits
For systemd, wrap ExecStart in `exec-env` instead of using an EnvironmentFile — same effect,
no plaintext on disk. The few OS-level paths that genuinely cannot be taught this (nix's
`authKeyFile`, sshd host keys) are the exception, and are noted in engine/README.md.
ADDING A SECRET: sops /secrets/store.yaml (opens decrypted in $EDITOR, re-encrypts on save)
"""
import json, os, subprocess, sys, pathlib
import json, os, subprocess, sys, pathlib, tempfile, shutil
STORE = os.environ.get("AO_SECRETS_STORE", "/secrets/store.yaml")
AGE_KEY = os.environ.get("SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE", os.path.expanduser("~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt"))
# name -> (path, mode). Files a consumer reads from a fixed location; see MATERIALIZED FILES.
MATERIALIZE = {
"tangled-session": ("engine/.tangled-session", 0o600), # relative to the project dir
"cc-ci-testenv": ("/srv/cc-ci/.testenv", 0o600),
}
def _load():
"""Decrypt the store. Fails loudly: a silent empty dict would look like 'no secrets'."""
@@ -67,23 +68,32 @@ def get_group(name):
return _load().get(name, {})
def materialize(name, project_dir="."):
"""Write a runtime file from the store. Returns the path written."""
if name == "tangled-session":
cookie = get("tangled.cookie")
if not cookie:
sys.exit("store has no tangled.cookie")
p = pathlib.Path(project_dir) / MATERIALIZE[name][0]
body = f"TANGLED_COOKIE={cookie}\n"
elif name == "cc-ci-testenv":
p = pathlib.Path(MATERIALIZE[name][0])
body = "".join(f"{k}={v}\n" for k, v in get_group("cc_ci_testenv").items())
else:
sys.exit(f"unknown materialize target {name!r} — known: {', '.join(MATERIALIZE)}")
p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
p.write_text(body)
p.chmod(MATERIALIZE[name][1])
return str(p)
def exec_env(group, argv):
"""Run argv with `group`'s keys added to the environment. Nothing touches the disk."""
vals = get_group(group)
if not vals:
sys.exit(f"no group {group!r} in the store (secrets.py list)")
env = {**os.environ, **{k: str(v) for k, v in vals.items()}}
return subprocess.call(argv, env=env)
def with_file(dotted, argv):
"""Run argv with `{}` replaced by a 0600 temp file holding the value.
The file lives in a private 0700 dir and is removed when the command exits — so a consumer
that insists on a path (ssh -i, a TLS key) never leaves a lasting second copy of the secret.
"""
val = get(dotted)
if val is None:
sys.exit(f"no such key: {dotted}")
d = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ao-secret-") # mkdtemp is 0700
try:
p = pathlib.Path(d) / dotted.split(".")[-1]
p.write_text(val if isinstance(val, str) else json.dumps(val))
p.chmod(0o600)
return subprocess.call([a.replace("{}", str(p)) for a in argv])
finally:
shutil.rmtree(d, ignore_errors=True)
def main():
@@ -102,12 +112,16 @@ def main():
if v is None:
sys.exit(f"no such key: {argv[1]}")
print(v if isinstance(v, str) else json.dumps(v))
elif cmd == "materialize":
if len(argv) < 2:
sys.exit(f"usage: secrets.py materialize <{'|'.join(MATERIALIZE)}>")
print("wrote", materialize(argv[1], argv[2] if len(argv) > 2 else "."))
elif cmd in ("exec-env", "with-file"):
if "--" not in argv:
sys.exit(f"usage: secrets.py {cmd} <name> -- <command...>")
i = argv.index("--")
if i != 2:
sys.exit(f"usage: secrets.py {cmd} <name> -- <command...>")
run = exec_env if cmd == "exec-env" else with_file
sys.exit(run(argv[1], argv[i + 1:]))
else:
sys.exit(f"unknown command {cmd!r} — list | get | materialize")
sys.exit(f"unknown command {cmd!r} — list | get | exec-env | with-file")
if __name__ == "__main__":