nix: sync atproto-likes module (non-root container, cache chown)

Upstream module dropped host-specific comments for its public repo, so the
context that matters here — gateway fronting, why this vhost stays off the
tailscale address group where opencode lives, and the exposure check script —
moves into the copy's header where it belongs.

Functional changes from upstream: the container now runs as uid 10001 and the
unit chowns the bind-mounted cache before start (without it, cache files left
by the earlier root container are unreadable and every cached actor 500s).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SmEK2voMnBa23495aLk1Ce
This commit is contained in:
autonomic-bot
2026-08-01 19:32:48 +00:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 21dfa22f9a
commit 340e0d62a4
+42 -49
View File
@@ -3,34 +3,34 @@
# ⚠️ COPY. Canonical source: # ⚠️ COPY. Canonical source:
# /srv/project-orchestrator/projects/notplants-atproto/nix/atproto-likes.nix # /srv/project-orchestrator/projects/notplants-atproto/nix/atproto-likes.nix
# Pure evaluation cannot import a path outside the flake tree. Re-copy after editing. # Pure evaluation cannot import a path outside the flake tree. Re-copy after editing.
#
# Host-specific context that is deliberately NOT in the public project repo:
# - the domain is fronted by the gateway (143.244.213.108); it forwards everything here
# - this vhost lists 0.0.0.0 only so it never shares an nginx address group with
# oc.commoninternet.net (opencode, on the tailscale address, no auth of its own)
# - /srv/project-orchestrator/projects/notplants-atproto/tools/check-exposure.sh asserts
# what this host serves publicly; run it after any nginx change
# behind the host's nginx. # behind the host's nginx.
# #
# Import this from the host configuration: # Import this from the host configuration:
# imports = [ /srv/project-orchestrator/projects/notplants-atproto/nix/atproto-likes.nix ]; # imports = [ /srv/project-orchestrator/projects/notplants-atproto/nix/atproto-likes.nix ];
# #
# What it sets up: # What it sets up:
# * the Docker daemon (this host had none before) # * the Docker daemon
# * a systemd unit that builds and runs docker-compose.yml from the project checkout # * a systemd unit that builds and runs docker-compose.yml from the project checkout
# * an nginx vhost for atproto.commoninternet.net with a Let's Encrypt cert, # * an nginx vhost for atproto.commoninternet.net with a Let's Encrypt cert,
# proxying to the container on 127.0.0.1:8731 # proxying to the container on 127.0.0.1:8731
# * ports 80/443 open (they were closed — only 22 was public) # * ports 80/443 opened in the firewall
# #
# DNS: atproto.commoninternet.net resolves to 143.244.213.108 — the operator's # DNS / TLS: point the domain's A record at this host (or at a reverse proxy that
# gateway (tailnet peer `gateway-server-aug2-9pm`, 100.80.66.110), which fronts this # forwards to it). ACME HTTP-01 needs the challenge to reach this nginx, so if a
# host rather than pointing at it directly. So what arrives here is the gateway's # proxy fronts the domain it must forward /.well-known/acme-challenge/ through.
# back-end hop. It must point at # Until a certificate is issued, NixOS installs a self-signed placeholder so nginx
# still starts.
# #
# http://168.119.126.100 (the PUBLIC address — never 100.84.190.30) # A proxy in front should preserve the Host header (nginx routes by server_name),
# # pass Upgrade/Connection through (the loading page is a websocket) and allow a
# because the tailscale address is where the opencode UI lives and is that address # long read timeout (a cold scan can run for minutes).
# group's default server; a hop there with a missing or wrong Host header would be
# served opencode. See the listen comments below. The gateway should also pass
# Upgrade/Connection through (the loading page is a websocket) and allow a long
# read timeout (a cold scan runs minutes).
#
# The gateway forwards everything, including /.well-known/acme-challenge/, so ACME
# HTTP-01 here will start succeeding as soon as the gateway has a route for this
# hostname. Until then nginx serves the self-signed placeholder NixOS installs.
{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }: { config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
let let
@@ -61,6 +61,14 @@ in
WorkingDirectory = projectDir; WorkingDirectory = projectDir;
# A cold `--build` pulls python:3.12-slim and installs pip deps. # A cold `--build` pulls python:3.12-slim and installs pip deps.
TimeoutStartSec = "1800"; TimeoutStartSec = "1800";
# The container runs unprivileged as uid 10001 (see Dockerfile), but the
# page cache is a host bind mount, so its ownership is the host's business.
# Without this the app 500s on any actor whose cache files were written by
# an earlier root-running container.
ExecStartPre = [
"${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/mkdir -p ${projectDir}/cache"
"${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/chown -R 10001:10001 ${projectDir}/cache"
];
ExecStart = "${compose} up -d --build --remove-orphans"; ExecStart = "${compose} up -d --build --remove-orphans";
ExecStop = "${compose} down"; ExecStop = "${compose} down";
Restart = "on-failure"; Restart = "on-failure";
@@ -72,30 +80,18 @@ in
enable = true; enable = true;
recommendedProxySettings = true; recommendedProxySettings = true;
virtualHosts.${domain} = { virtualHosts.${domain} = {
# addSSL, NOT forceSSL. DNS for this domain points at the gateway # addSSL, NOT forceSSL. If a reverse proxy fronts this domain and its
# (143.244.213.108), which fronts this host — so the request that actually # back-end hop is plain HTTP, a forced 301 to https://<domain>/ would
# arrives here is the gateway's back-end hop. If that hop is plain HTTP and # resolve straight back to that proxy — a redirect loop. Serving both
# we answered with a 301 to https://atproto.commoninternet.net/, it would # schemes lets whatever is in front decide where TLS terminates.
# resolve straight back to the gateway: a redirect loop. Serve both schemes
# and let the gateway decide where TLS terminates.
addSSL = true; addSSL = true;
# The gateway forwards everything, so once it has a route for this hostname
# the HTTP-01 challenge reaches us and this starts succeeding on its own.
# Until then the acme-atproto… unit sits in `failed` and nginx uses the
# self-signed placeholder; nothing else on the host is affected.
enableACME = true; enableACME = true;
# PUBLIC INTERFACE ONLY — deliberately not the tailscale address. # Listens on 0.0.0.0 only, and the reject-everything default server below
# # owns those addresses. nginx groups server blocks by the connection's local
# nginx groups servers by the connection's local address and prefers the most # address, so keeping this vhost on the public address alone means it never
# specific listen. `oc.commoninternet.net` (the opencode UI) binds explicitly # shares an address group with anything else the host may serve on another
# to 100.84.190.30:80, so that address has its own group in which oc is the # interface — no other service can be reached by sending this one an
# DEFAULT server. Anything arriving there without a matching Host — a proxy # unexpected Host header.
# that drops the header, or sends `Host: 100.84.190.30` — is served opencode.
# So the gateway must hop to the PUBLIC address, never the tailscale one:
# this vhost lives on 0.0.0.0, where the only servers are itself and the
# reject-everything default below. Keeping the two names on disjoint
# addresses is what makes "opencode cannot leak publicly" structural rather
# than a matter of getting a Host header right.
locations."/" = { locations."/" = {
proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString hostPort}"; proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString hostPort}";
# The loading page streams scan progress over a websocket. # The loading page streams scan progress over a websocket.
@@ -109,17 +105,14 @@ in
}; };
}; };
# Strict default server for the PUBLIC addresses. Without an explicit # Strict default server for the public addresses. Without an explicit
# default_server, nginx promotes the first server block in the group — so # default_server, nginx promotes the first server block in the group — so any
# every future vhost added to 0.0.0.0 silently becomes the thing that answers # vhost added later silently becomes what answers unmatched, absent or spoofed
# unmatched/absent/spoofed Host headers from the internet. This closes that # Host headers from the internet. This closes that door once: only names
# door once: only names we deliberately serve get a response here. # deliberately served get a response.
# #
# port 80 -> 444 (close the connection, no response at all) # port 80 -> 444 (close the connection, no response at all)
# port 443 -> ssl_reject_handshake, so an unknown SNI never even gets TLS # port 443 -> ssl_reject_handshake, so an unknown SNI never even gets TLS
#
# It listens only on 0.0.0.0, so the tailscale address group is untouched and
# oc.commoninternet.net keeps behaving exactly as before on the tailnet.
virtualHosts."public-default-reject" = { virtualHosts."public-default-reject" = {
default = true; default = true;
serverName = null; serverName = null;
@@ -134,9 +127,9 @@ in
security.acme = { security.acme = {
acceptTerms = true; acceptTerms = true;
defaults.email = "mfowler.email@protonmail.com"; defaults.email = "mfowler.email@protonmail.com"; # ACME contact
}; };
# Public HTTP/HTTPS. Before this, only 22 was open on the public interface. # Public HTTP/HTTPS.
networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 80 443 ]; networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 80 443 ];
} }