The image name was packed into the value, so the flag needed a hand-rolled
KEY=FROM:TO parser with its own malformed-input branch, and 'window' named the
wrong thing — the tool has two kinds of window (version ranges and, on the date
fallback, real date windows) and the flag meant only the first.
Now each part is its own argument: --image redis 7.4 8.10, repeatable, all in
one call. argparse enforces the arity, so the string parsing and its error path
are deleted. 'windows' survives internally as the computed-range concept.
Counts unchanged: discourse 128 with redis / 123 without, gitea 2.
A recipe upgrades several images, each through its own version range. The scan
previously classified only the app repo, so sidecar bumps contributed nothing — the
alternative to the earlier bug where sidecars were judged by the APP's window and
produced a false 133.
Now: --window KEY=FROM:TO (repeatable) gives any other source its own range; each
window is classified independently (one may use patched-version ranges while another
falls back to advisory dates) and the count is the UNION. An image with no window is
still not counted — the scan will not guess a range it was not given. If ANY requested
window cannot be ordered, the total is UNKNOWN rather than a partial number.
/recipe-upgrade now instructs passing a --window per bumped sidecar.
Verified on discourse app 3.5.3->2026.7.1 + redis 7.4->8.10: 128 = 123 (app, by
publish date) + 5 (redis, by version range). The redis five are genuine for that bump
(patched 7.4.1 / 7.4.6 / 8.2.3) and include CVE-2025-49844, CRITICAL — previously
invisible. Regressions clean: gitea still 2, discourse without the sidecar window
still 123.
Step-by-step specification of cc-ci-plan/advisory-scan.py: inputs, the three source
classes and why each is ranked where it is, the union, both classification paths
(patched-version ranges, and the advisory-publish-date fallback for version-scheme
changes), the output contract, and how /recipe-report must read it.
Each rule records the production wrong answer that motivated it — the false 133 from
cross-image counting, the n8n misclassification from reading only vulnerabilities[0],
the '?' sprawl from url punctuation and benign-404s, and the 'never emit 0 for an
undetermined count' rule. Claims cross-checked against the implementation.
Keep this file in the same commit as any behaviour change.
autonomic-bot