Files
cc-ci-orchestrator/.claude/skills/cve-check/SKILL.md
T
autonomic-bot 74117c2260 cve-check: record the remedy for a blind recipe, not just the symptom
The skill said to render a sourceless recipe as '?'. It now says how to stop it
being sourceless: declare an NVD CPE in the registry. That is what took the fleet
from two blind recipes to zero, and it is the first thing to try when the sweep
flags another.
2026-08-11 22:16:52 +00:00

13 KiB

name, description
name description
cve-check Fleet-wide CVE sweep WITHOUT upgrading anything. For every recipe cc-ci deploys, works out what upgrade is available (current pinned tag → newest supported tag, per image including sidecars), runs the deterministic advisory scan over that window, adjudicates whatever the scan could not decide, and publishes a CVE report to report.ci.commoninternet.net as cve-<DATE>.html. READ-ONLY — opens no PRs, edits no recipes, runs no CI, merges nothing. Answers "what are we exposed to that an upgrade would fix?" in minutes rather than the hours a full upgrade run takes. Invoke as /cve-check [recipe ...] [--weekly-only].

cve-check

A security sweep, not an upgrade run. It answers one question for every recipe cc-ci deploys:

If we upgraded this recipe today, how many CVEs would that fix, and how bad are they?

It is the cheap, safe half of /upgrade-all: the same version research and the same advisory scan, with no implementation, no CI, and no PRs. Use it when you want the security picture now — after a vendor announcement, before deciding what to prioritise, or between weekly runs. When you want the PRs too, use /cve-check-and-upgrade.

Read-only, absolutely. Never edit a recipe, never open or comment on a PR, never merge, never deploy. The only thing it writes is its own log and the published report page.

Arguments

  • <recipe> … — sweep only these recipes (else every recipe in cc-ci-plan/used-recipes.md).
  • --weekly-only — skip rows tagged external. Off by default on purpose: an external recipe is still deployed and still exposes us, so a security sweep that silently skipped it would misreport the fleet's exposure. Externals are swept and clearly marked "maintained elsewhere" in the report.

Procedure

⚠️ Run abra over a pseudo-TTY (or it FATAs inappropriate ioctl for device)

abra needs a TTY. Wrap every abra call: ssh cc-ci 'script -qec "abra <args> -n" /dev/null'. (git and other commands do NOT need the wrapper.)

1. Build the candidate list

Read cc-ci-plan/used-recipes.md — the canonical inventory. Take every row (both tiers), recording the tier per recipe; with --weekly-only, drop the external rows. An explicit recipe argument overrides any skip.

2. Per recipe — establish the upgrade window WITHOUT upgrading

This is /recipe-upgrade step 1's research, stopping before it implements anything.

⚠️ The same four things that silently skip recipes apply here — handle ALL FOUR:

  1. pseudo-TTY — per the box above.
  2. go-git auth to git.autonomic.zone — recipes on the private mirror FATA authentication required: Unauthorized. Bake creds into origin first (idempotent, only when origin is on git.autonomic.zone): git -C ~/.abra/recipes/<r> remote set-url origin "https://$GITEA_USERNAME:$GITEA_PASSWORD@git.autonomic.zone/recipe-maintainers/<r>.git"
  3. dirty worktree — usually just the untracked cc-ci overlay; git stash -u before, stash pop after. Only a genuinely dirty TRACKED tree is a skip.
  4. tag+digest pins abra cannot parse — abra FATAs and aborts the WHOLE recipe (immich). Do not hand-check the registry; run the resolver, which is abra-independent and covers every image:
    python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/resolve-images.py <recipe> --ssh cc-ci --table
    
    It reports, per image, newest_within_major (the compatibility-safe pick) and newest_same_shape (the newest of that tag's form). Use newest_within_major unless you have checked the app supports the major jump — immich's postgres tag encodes the pg major plus the vectorchord/pgvectors versions immich-server is built against, so taking the newest would break the deploy. all_resolved: false means an image could NOT be resolved — that is a ?, never a 0.

Reconcile the mirror from true upstream FIRST — ALWAYS, no exceptions — one command, cc-ci-plan/reconcile-upstream.sh <recipe>... | --all. This is the same reconcile /upgrade-all does. Do not skip it in the name of keeping the sweep read-only: skipping it makes you research a stale checkout, and on the first real run that produced two recipes with no survey output at all, which is indistinguishable from "no upgrades" unless you check. It is safe — recipe work lives in branches, never directly on main, so a force-sync of main to upstream discards nothing; it also auto-closes mirror PRs whose changes upstream has already merged.

⚠️ The default branch may be master, not main — check, do not assume

Several coopcloud recipes keep a stale main alongside the real default master. gitea is one: main sits at 1.24.2-rootless while master has 1.27.1-rootless plus the merged PRs and the 3.6.3 release. Reading main there tells you the recipe is three releases behind and missing two CVSS-9.8 RCE fixes — a false alarm that reads exactly like a real one. Resolve the default branch from the API (/api/v1/repos/coop-cloud/<recipe> → default_branch) before reading any file, and never git reset --hard origin/main on a checkout that tracks master.

Cross-check abra with the resolver. abra is the primary source, but it silently contributes nothing for images it cannot parse, and it reported "no new versions" for images that did have them (mumble v1.6.870-0 → -4). Run resolve-images.py for every recipe and take the UNION of the two: on the first real sweep the resolver found upgrades abra missed entirely in five recipes, one of which (plausible's clickhouse) carried four CVEs.

Then read versions:

set -a; . /srv/cc-ci/.testenv; set +a
ssh cc-ci "GITEA_USERNAME='$GITEA_USERNAME' GITEA_PASSWORD='$GITEA_PASSWORD' GITEA_URL='$GITEA_URL' bash -s <recipe> --reconcile-only" \
   < /srv/cc-ci/.claude/skills/recipe-upgrade/open-recipe-pr.sh
ssh cc-ci 'export PATH=/run/current-system/sw/bin:$PATH; R=<recipe>; \
  git -C ~/.abra/recipes/$R stash -u >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; \
  script -qec "abra recipe fetch $R --force -n" /dev/null; \
  script -qec "abra recipe upgrade $R -m -n" /dev/null; \
  git -C ~/.abra/recipes/$R stash pop >/dev/null 2>&1 || true'

For each recipe produce one window per image: current pinned tag → newest supported tag. You need the sidecars (redis, postgres, nginx …), not just the app — a sidecar bump is where discourse's only CRITICAL came from, and an image with no window is not counted at all.

  • No upgrade available → the recipe is UPTODATE; its CVE count is 0, not ?. There is nothing an upgrade could fix. Record it and move on.
  • No output at all is NOT "no upgrade". An abra call that times out, FATAs, or prints nothing leaves the recipe unverified — treat it as a distinct outcome, never fold it into up-to-date. Re-run it, and if it still yields nothing, resolve the versions by direct registry check (box item 4). Only report ? once BOTH the abra check and the direct check have failed. On the first real run this distinction was the difference between two false zeros and the truth (both recipes turned out fine, but nothing in the survey said so).

2c. Know which recipes CANNOT see CVEs at all

python3 cc-ci-plan/audit-sources.py --security-sources

A recipe whose sources yield no CVE data at all cannot produce a meaningful 0 — nothing was measured, the same way a missing registry file cannot. Render those as ?, not 0.

The fleet is currently at zero such recipes. The last two — mattermost-lts (empty advisory feed, client-side-rendered bulletins) and mumble (nothing published anywhere) — were fixed by declaring an NVD CPE in their registry:

- nvd-cpe: mattermost-team-edition = cpe:2.3:a:mattermost:mattermost_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

If this sweep ever reports a blind recipe again, that is the fix: find the product's CPE at nvd.nist.gov and add the line. Prefer a real advisory feed or an attributable changelog when one exists — NVD lags the vendor — but a lagging source beats no source, and it turns a ? into a number.

An unparseable page is NOT the same thing: it is harmless when the same project also publishes an advisory feed (redis, gitea, minio, clickhouse all do). Only "no usable source for this image" counts.

3. Run the advisory scan over that window

python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/advisory-scan.py <recipe> --from <old-app> --to <new-app> \
        [--image <name>=<old>:<new>]...

One call per recipe with every image in it — the count is a union across images, and the UNKNOWN guarantee only holds when a single run sees them all. Paste the markdown block verbatim into the per-recipe log at /srv/cc-ci/.cc-ci-logs/cve-check/<DATE>/<recipe>.md.

4. Adjudicate what the scan could not decide (pass 2)

If the block reports advisories it could NOT judge, or the count is UNKNOWN, re-run with --adjudicate and decide each open case yourself:

python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/advisory-scan.py <recipe> … --adjudicate

Answer FIXED / NOT-FIXED / STILL-UNKNOWN per case, each with a one-line reason citing the evidence shown — never from memory of the project, which is the exact failure that let two CVSS-9.8 gitea RCEs be published as "none". Every FIXED is added to the count; pass 1's number is a floor. The block also lists what pass 1 already decided — if a verdict looks wrong given its evidence, say so. Record your verdicts in the per-recipe log so the number is auditable.

5. Classify severity and priority

For each recipe collect the CVE ids with severities (the scan gives them, with GHSA ids). Sort the report rows by what an operator should deal with first:

  1. recipes with a critical, then high, then anything else with CVEs (more CVEs higher within a band);
  2. then ? (a count that could not be established — investigate, do not ignore);
  3. then recipes with an upgrade available but 0 CVEs;
  4. then UPTODATE.

Severity outranks raw count: 2 CVSS-9.8 RCEs matter more than 120 medium plugin advisories.

6. Write the report spec

/tmp/cve-spec-<DATE>.json, same shape as /recipe-report (see recipe-report.py's header), with:

  • "kind": "cve" — titles the page "The Recipe Report — CVE check" and files it as cve-<DATE>.html. It appears in the SAME archive index as the weekly editions, suffixed "— CVE check" so the two are told apart at a glance. Without this field you would overwrite that date's weekly edition.
  • date, subtitle "CVE check ",
  • lead — one short paragraph: fleet exposure in a sentence and what to do first.
  • table[] — every recipe swept. recipe; change = the window you scanned, e.g. 1.27.0 → 1.27.1 · redis 7.4 → 8.10; status = UPTODATE when nothing is available, else PENDING (an upgrade exists and is not yet taken); cve = the count (integer, ? only per the rules below); notes = severity mix, whether the number is a floor, and maintained elsewhere for external rows. Leave ci/pr empty — nothing was built and no PR exists.
  • addendum[] — real anomalies only: registry URLs that failed, recipes whose window could not be established, a scan whose count is a floor with many undetermined advisories.
  • security[] — one entry per critical/high finding: recipe · CVE id(s) + severity · what it fixes · which image it is in. Name the image: CVE-2025-49844 is a redis flaw, and an operator reading "discourse" needs to know that.
  • changes[] — omit (nothing changed; there are no PRs).

? must stay RARE. Use it only when a scan ran and reported genuinely failed sources, or the count came back UNKNOWN and adjudication could not settle it. Never none for an unknown — a blank reads as clean. A recipe with no upgrade available is 0, not ?. Many ? is a bug for the Addendum.

7. Render and publish — via the script only

python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/recipe-report.py render /tmp/cve-spec-<DATE>.json /tmp/cve-<DATE>.html
python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/recipe-report.py publish /tmp/cve-<DATE>.html <DATE> cve

All layout is owned by recipe-report.py. Never hand-write or post-process HTML; if render errors, fix the spec JSON and re-render. Public page — no secrets, tokens, internal hostnames, raw logs, or any billing/spend figures.

8. Verify and stop

curl -fsS https://report.ci.commoninternet.net/cve-<DATE>.html renders and the index lists it. Print the URL, a one-line summary (N recipes swept · M with CVEs · K critical), and CVE CHECK COMPLETE, then go idle. One-shot — do not loop, and do not start upgrading anything.

Guardrails

  • Read-only. No PRs, no edits, no merges, no deploys, no CI runs. If a recipe looks urgent, say so in the report — do not act on it. /cve-check-and-upgrade is the skill that acts.
  • Never report 0 for something you could not scan. 0 means checked-and-clean; unknown is ?.
  • A count with undetermined advisories is a floor — say so in the notes rather than rounding away.
  • Public-safe output only.