Files
cc-ci-orchestrator/cc-ci-plan/advisory-scan.py
T
autonomic-bot b5f8543a9b advisory-scan: count sidecar CVEs via per-image windows
A recipe upgrades several images, each through its own version range. The scan
previously classified only the app repo, so sidecar bumps contributed nothing — the
alternative to the earlier bug where sidecars were judged by the APP's window and
produced a false 133.

Now: --window KEY=FROM:TO (repeatable) gives any other source its own range; each
window is classified independently (one may use patched-version ranges while another
falls back to advisory dates) and the count is the UNION. An image with no window is
still not counted — the scan will not guess a range it was not given. If ANY requested
window cannot be ordered, the total is UNKNOWN rather than a partial number.

/recipe-upgrade now instructs passing a --window per bumped sidecar.

Verified on discourse app 3.5.3->2026.7.1 + redis 7.4->8.10: 128 = 123 (app, by
publish date) + 5 (redis, by version range). The redis five are genuine for that bump
(patched 7.4.1 / 7.4.6 / 8.2.3) and include CVE-2025-49844, CRITICAL — previously
invisible. Regressions clean: gitea still 2, discourse without the sidecar window
still 123.
2026-08-10 22:01:28 +00:00

528 lines
26 KiB
Python
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Deterministic per-recipe CVE/advisory scan — an ADDITIVE pre-step for /recipe-upgrade.
WHY THIS EXISTS (2026-08-10): gitea 1.27.1 fixed two CVSS-9.8 RCEs (CVE-2026-60004,
CVE-2026-59774). Our weekly report showed gitea's CVE count as "1", then "none". The upgrade
subagent had scanned the GitHub *release notes*, which mention neither; the two CVEs were announced
only in the vendor's blog security section. The report generator then derived security content from
those notes plus model knowledge — and the model's training predates the CVEs. Nothing in the
pipeline ever queried an advisory source, so a critical CVE that is newer than the model and absent
from the changelog was invisible by construction.
WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: it does not replace or alter any existing security analysis. It is a strictly
ADDITIONAL evidence source whose findings are unioned into the CVE count.
SOURCES (measured against the gitea case before being chosen):
1. GitHub Security Advisories API — repos/<owner>/<repo>/security-advisories. PRIMARY: carries
CVE id, GHSA id, severity AND vulnerable/patched version ranges, so "fixed by THIS upgrade" is
computable rather than guessed. Found both gitea CVEs. Derived from the source-repo URLs the
per-recipe registry already records — no new per-recipe config needed.
2. Vendor release/security pages — every URL in cc-ci-plan/upstream/<recipe>.md, fetched and
regex-scanned for CVE ids. This is what would have caught gitea: the vendor blog names both,
while the GitHub releases page names neither. Add vendor security/announcement URLs to the
registry to widen this.
3. OSV.dev — supplementary, best-effort, only when the recipe declares an ecosystem/package
mapping below. NOTE: for gitea, OSV returned only Go *dependency* advisories and 404'd on both
application CVEs; NVD's API had them neither by CPE, CVE id, nor keyword. Advisory databases
lag the vendor — which is exactly why (1) and (2) lead.
Every source reports its own status, so "checked, none found" is never confused with "not checked".
Usage:
advisory-scan.py <recipe> [--from <version>] [--to <version>] [--json] [--registry DIR]
--from/--to are the app versions being upgraded between (e.g. 1.26.2 -> 1.27.1). When given, each
advisory is classified fixed-by-this-upgrade / still-open / older. Without them everything known
is listed unclassified. Exits 0 even when sources fail (informational; failures are reported).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import gzip
import json
import os
import re
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
REGISTRY_DIR = os.environ.get("CCCI_UPSTREAM_REGISTRY", "/srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/upstream")
UA = "cc-ci-advisory-scan (+https://git.autonomic.zone/recipe-maintainers/cc-ci)"
TIMEOUT = int(os.environ.get("ADVISORY_SCAN_TIMEOUT", "45"))
CVE_RE = re.compile(r"CVE-\d{4}-\d{4,7}")
# Leading-version-component jump that means the scheme changed (semver → calver).
SCHEME_JUMP = 100
# Optional OSV mappings: recipe -> (ecosystem, package). Supplementary only (see module docstring).
OSV_PACKAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
"gitea": ("Go", "code.gitea.io/gitea"),
"n8n": ("npm", "n8n"),
}
def _github_token() -> str | None:
"""Read-only GitHub token, for the API rate limit ONLY (60/hr anonymous → 5000/hr with a token).
Env `GITHUB_TOKEN` wins; otherwise the file at `GITHUB_TOKEN_FILE` (default
/srv/cc-ci/.github-token, chmod 600, never in git). Reading PUBLIC security advisories needs NO
scopes at all — create a classic PAT with every box unticked, or a fine-grained token limited to
"Public repositories: read". Do NOT grant repo/write scopes: this tool only ever GETs advisories.
A missing token is not an error — the scan simply runs anonymously and will report sources as
failed once the 60/hr limit bites, which is visible rather than silent.
"""
tok = os.environ.get("GITHUB_TOKEN")
if tok:
return tok.strip()
path = os.environ.get("GITHUB_TOKEN_FILE", "/srv/cc-ci/.github-token")
try:
with open(path) as f:
return f.read().strip() or None
except OSError:
return None
def _gh_paginate(url: str, hdrs: dict, max_pages: int = 20):
"""Yield every row from a GitHub list endpoint, following Link rel=\"next\" cursors."""
seen_keys = set()
for _ in range(max_pages):
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": UA, **hdrs})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:
rows = json.load(r)
link = r.headers.get("Link", "") or ""
fresh = 0
for a in rows:
k = a.get("ghsa_id") or json.dumps(a, sort_keys=True)[:120]
if k not in seen_keys:
seen_keys.add(k); fresh += 1
yield a
nxt = None
for part in link.split(","):
if 'rel="next"' in part:
nxt = part.split(";")[0].strip().strip("<>")
if not nxt or fresh == 0:
return
url = nxt
def _tag_date(owner: str, repo: str, version: str | None) -> str | None:
"""Publish date of a release tag, for DATE-BASED classification (see classify_by_date).
Version strings cannot be ordered across a scheme change (semver → calver), but tag dates
always can. Tries the common tag spellings; returns an ISO timestamp or None."""
if not version:
return None
hdrs = {"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json"}
tok = _github_token()
if tok:
hdrs["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {tok}"
for tag in (f"v{version}", version):
try:
ref = json.loads(_fetch(f"https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/git/ref/tags/{tag}", hdrs))
obj = ref.get("object", {})
sha, typ = obj.get("sha"), obj.get("type")
if typ == "tag":
t = json.loads(_fetch(f"https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/git/tags/{sha}", hdrs))
if t.get("tagger", {}).get("date"):
return t["tagger"]["date"]
sha = t.get("object", {}).get("sha")
c = json.loads(_fetch(f"https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits/{sha}", hdrs))
return c["commit"]["committer"]["date"]
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — try the next spelling
continue
return None
def _fetch(url: str, headers: dict | None = None) -> str:
h = {"User-Agent": UA, "Accept-Encoding": "gzip"}
h.update(headers or {})
with urllib.request.urlopen(urllib.request.Request(url, headers=h), timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:
raw = r.read()
if r.headers.get("Content-Encoding") == "gzip":
raw = gzip.decompress(raw)
return raw.decode(errors="replace")
def _vkey(v: str | None) -> tuple:
"""Loose version ordering key: leading integers of each dot-part ('1.27.1-rootless' -> (1,27,1))."""
if not v:
return ()
v = v.strip().lstrip("vV").split("+")[0]
out = []
for part in re.split(r"[.\-_]", v):
m = re.match(r"^\d+", part)
if m:
out.append(int(m.group()))
elif out:
break
return tuple(out)
def registry_urls(recipe: str, registry_dir: str) -> tuple[list[str], str | None]:
path = os.path.join(registry_dir, f"{recipe}.md")
try:
with open(path) as f:
text = f.read()
except OSError:
return [], None
urls = []
for u in re.findall(r"https?://[^\s)|\]]+", text):
# The registry is MARKDOWN: urls appear inside `backticks`, 'quotes', **bold**, and at the
# end of sentences. Trailing punctuation captured into the url makes the fetch 404 and the
# recipe render '?' for no real reason — that is what put immich and n8n in the unknown
# column on 2026-08-07 (https://docs.n8n.io/release-notes/` ← note the backtick).
u = u.rstrip("`'\"*.,;:>)")
if u and u not in urls:
urls.append(u)
return urls, path
def github_advisories(urls: list[str]) -> list[dict]:
"""Query GitHub Security Advisories for every github.com/<owner>/<repo> in the registry."""
seen, results = set(), []
for u in urls:
m = re.match(r"https?://github\.com/([^/]+)/([^/#?]+)", u)
if not m:
continue
owner, repo = m.group(1), m.group(2).removesuffix(".git")
if (owner, repo) in seen:
continue
seen.add((owner, repo))
api = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/security-advisories?per_page=100"
hdrs = {"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json"}
tok = _github_token()
if tok:
hdrs["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {tok}"
entry = {"source": f"github-advisories:{owner}/{repo}", "status": "ok", "advisories": []}
try:
# PAGINATE. This endpoint caps at 100 per response and IGNORES ?page= — it returns the
# same rows again, which silently truncates busy projects (discourse has 286; a hand
# count on 2026-08-10 found 123 CVEs in one upgrade window that a single page missed).
# Follow the Link rel="next" cursor to exhaustion instead.
for a in _gh_paginate(api, hdrs):
# An advisory carries ONE ENTRY PER PATCHED RELEASE LINE. n8n patches three
# (1.123.32, 2.17.4, 2.18.1); reading only vulnerabilities[0] silently dropped the
# line our deployment is actually on, so CVE-2026-42231/42232 classified as
# out-of-window. Keep them ALL and let the classifier match any of them.
vulns = a.get("vulnerabilities") or []
entry["advisories"].append(
{
"cve": a.get("cve_id"),
"ghsa": a.get("ghsa_id"),
"severity": a.get("severity"),
"summary": (a.get("summary") or "")[:200],
"vulnerable_range": "; ".join(
filter(None, (v.get("vulnerable_version_range") for v in vulns))
) or None,
"patched": "; ".join(
filter(None, (v.get("patched_versions") for v in vulns))
) or None,
"url": a.get("html_url"),
"published_at": a.get("published_at"),
}
)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
# 404 = this repo simply publishes no security advisories (e.g. sidecar images like
# pgautoupgrade). That is a BENIGN ABSENCE, not a failed check — conflating the two
# would push nearly every recipe to "unknown" and make the ? signal meaningless again.
entry["status"] = "no-advisories-published" if e.code == 404 else f"error: HTTP {e.code}"
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 — a genuinely dead source must be REPORTED, never silent
entry["status"] = f"error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}"
results.append(entry)
return results
def vendor_pages(urls: list[str]) -> list[dict]:
"""Fetch each registry URL and regex out CVE ids, with a little surrounding context."""
out = []
for u in urls:
if u.startswith("https://api.github.com"):
continue
if re.search(r"[<>{}]|\bVERSION\b|\bvX\.Y\.Z\b", u):
# Registry entries sometimes carry TEMPLATE urls for humans
# (…/changelog/v<VERSION>/). They are documentation, not fetchable — skipping them is
# correct; counting them as failures would wrongly mark the recipe's count unreliable.
out.append({"source": u, "status": "skipped: template URL (not fetchable)", "cves": [], "context": {}})
continue
entry = {"source": u, "status": "ok", "cves": [], "context": {}}
try:
text = _fetch(u)
plain = re.sub(r"<[^>]+>", " ", text)
for cve in sorted(set(CVE_RE.findall(plain))):
entry["cves"].append(cve)
i = plain.find(cve)
entry["context"][cve] = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", plain[max(0, i - 160) : i + 200]).strip()
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
entry["status"] = f"error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}"
out.append(entry)
return out
def osv(recipe: str, version: str | None) -> dict | None:
pkg = OSV_PACKAGES.get(recipe)
if not pkg or not version:
return None
eco, name = pkg
entry = {"source": f"osv:{eco}/{name}@{version}", "status": "ok", "cves": []}
try:
body = json.dumps({"package": {"name": name, "ecosystem": eco}, "version": version}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
"https://api.osv.dev/v1/query", data=body,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": UA}, method="POST",
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:
data = json.load(r)
ids = set()
for v in data.get("vulns", []):
for a in [v.get("id")] + (v.get("aliases") or []):
if a and a.startswith("CVE"):
ids.add(a)
entry["cves"] = sorted(ids)
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
entry["status"] = f"error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}"
return entry
def scan(recipe: str, v_from: str | None, v_to: str | None, registry_dir: str,
extra_windows: list[tuple[str, str, str]] | None = None) -> dict:
urls, reg_path = registry_urls(recipe, registry_dir)
report: dict = {
"recipe": recipe,
"from": v_from,
"to": v_to,
"registry": reg_path,
"registry_urls": len(urls),
"sources": [],
"cves": {},
}
if reg_path is None:
report["sources"].append(
{"source": f"registry:{recipe}.md", "status": "error: registry file not found"}
)
def record(cve: str, src: str, **extra):
e = report["cves"].setdefault(cve, {"sources": [], "severity": None, "ghsa": None,
"vulnerable_range": None, "patched": None,
"context": None, "published_at": None})
if src not in e["sources"]:
e["sources"].append(src)
for k, v in extra.items():
if v and not e.get(k):
e[k] = v
for entry in github_advisories(urls):
report["sources"].append({"source": entry["source"], "status": entry["status"],
"found": len(entry.get("advisories", []))})
for a in entry.get("advisories", []):
if a.get("cve"):
record(a["cve"], entry["source"], severity=a.get("severity"), ghsa=a.get("ghsa"),
vulnerable_range=a.get("vulnerable_range"), patched=a.get("patched"),
context=a.get("summary"), published_at=a.get("published_at"))
for entry in vendor_pages(urls):
report["sources"].append({"source": entry["source"], "status": entry["status"],
"found": len(entry.get("cves", []))})
for cve in entry.get("cves", []):
record(cve, entry["source"], context=entry["context"].get(cve))
for version in filter(None, (v_from, v_to)):
o = osv(recipe, version)
if o:
report["sources"].append({"source": o["source"], "status": o["status"],
"found": len(o.get("cves", []))})
for cve in o.get("cves", []):
record(cve, o["source"])
# Classify against the upgrade window when we know it: an advisory is "fixed by this upgrade"
# when its patched version is newer than `from` and no newer than `to`.
#
# TWO HARD-WON CONSTRAINTS (2026-08-10, discourse reported a false 133):
# a) The window belongs to ONE image. Advisories from OTHER repos in the registry (redis,
# postgres, nginx sidecars) must NOT be judged by it — redis CVE-2021-21309, patched in
# redis 6.0.11, scored as "fixed" because 6.0.11 sits numerically inside discourse's
# 3.5.3 → 2026.7.1 window. Only the PRIMARY app repo is classified; every other source is
# reported as unclassified so a human/agent still sees it but it never inflates the count.
# b) A version-SCHEME change (semver → calver, 3.5.3 → 2026.7.1) makes numeric ordering
# meaningless: 2025.12.2 compares "newer" than 3.5.3 while shipping earlier. When the
# leading component jumps by more than SCHEME_JUMP we refuse to classify and say so,
# rather than emitting a confident wrong number.
# ── Classification ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# A recipe upgrades SEVERAL images (app + redis/postgres/nginx sidecars), each with its OWN
# version window. Judging every advisory by the app's window is how discourse once reported a
# false 133 (34 of them redis CVEs, incl. one patched in redis 6.0.11 in 2021). So each source
# is classified against ITS OWN window, and the count is the union across windows.
#
# --from/--to → the PRIMARY app repo (first github source in the registry)
# --window K=F:T → any other source whose name contains K (repeatable), e.g. redis=7.4:8.10
#
# A source with no window is not classified: its advisories are listed as unclassified so they
# stay visible without inflating the count.
gh_sources = [x["source"] for x in report["sources"] if x["source"].startswith("github-advisories:")]
primary = gh_sources[0] if (gh_sources and (v_from or v_to)) else None
report["primary_source"] = primary
windows = {} # source name -> (from, to)
if primary:
windows[primary] = (v_from, v_to)
for key, wf, wt in (extra_windows or []):
for src in gh_sources:
if key.lower() in src.lower() and src not in windows:
windows[src] = (wf, wt)
report["windows"] = {k: {"from": f, "to": t} for k, (f, t) in windows.items()}
def _classify_window(src, wf, wt):
"""Return (set_of_fixed_cves, method, date_window|None, unresolved:boolean) for one source."""
kf, kt = _vkey(wf), _vkey(wt)
# A version-SCHEME change (semver 3.5.3 → calver 2026.7.1) makes numeric ordering
# meaningless: 2025.12.2 compares "newer" than 3.5.3 while shipping earlier.
scheme = bool(kf and kt and abs(kt[0] - kf[0]) >= SCHEME_JUMP)
if not scheme:
got = set()
for cve, e in report["cves"].items():
if src not in e["sources"]:
continue
cands = [_vkey(t) for t in re.findall(r"\d+(?:\.\d+)*", e.get("patched") or "")]
if kf and kt and any(kf < c <= kt for c in cands):
got.add(cve)
return got, "patched version ranges", None, False
# DATE FALLBACK: release DATES always order, even across a scheme change. Resolve both
# versions to git tag dates and count advisories PUBLISHED in that window — the method a
# hand count used to establish discourse 3.5.3 (2025-12-30) → 2026.7.1 (2026-07-31) = 123.
owner, _, repo = src.split(":", 1)[1].partition("/")
d_from, d_to = _tag_date(owner, repo, wf), _tag_date(owner, repo, wt)
if d_from and d_to and d_from < d_to:
got = {cve for cve, e in report["cves"].items()
if src in e["sources"] and e.get("published_at")
and d_from < e["published_at"] <= d_to}
return got, "advisory publish date (version scheme changed)", (d_from, d_to), False
return set(), "unresolved", None, True
fixed_set, methods, date_windows, unresolved_any = set(), {}, {}, False
for src, (wf, wt) in windows.items():
got, method, dw, unresolved = _classify_window(src, wf, wt)
methods[src] = method
if dw:
date_windows[src] = {"from": dw[0], "to": dw[1]}
if unresolved:
unresolved_any = True
for cve in got:
report["cves"][cve]["classification"] = f"fixed-by-this-upgrade ({method}) via {src}"
fixed_set.add(cve)
unknown = []
for cve, e in report["cves"].items():
if cve in fixed_set:
continue
if not any(src in e["sources"] for src in windows):
e["classification"] = "unclassified: no version window given for this image"
unknown.append(cve)
else:
e.setdefault("classification", "outside-window")
if e["classification"] == "outside-window":
pass
else:
unknown.append(cve)
report["classified_by"] = methods
if date_windows:
report["date_window"] = date_windows
report["fixed_by_this_upgrade"] = sorted(fixed_set)
report["unclassified"] = sorted(unknown)
# NEVER report 0 for something we could not determine — a 0 asserts safety. If ANY requested
# window could not be ordered at all, the total is UNKNOWN rather than a partial number.
report["count_known"] = not unresolved_any
report["cve_count_fixed"] = len(fixed_set) if not unresolved_any else None
report["cve_count_total_seen"] = len(report["cves"])
# Only GENUINE failures make a count unreliable. "no-advisories-published" (404: the repo has
# no advisory feed) and "skipped: template URL" are benign and must not degrade the verdict.
report["sources_failed"] = [
s["source"]
for s in report["sources"]
if not (s["status"] == "ok" or s["status"].startswith(("no-advisories-published", "skipped:")))
]
report["sources_benign"] = [
s["source"]
for s in report["sources"]
if s["status"].startswith(("no-advisories-published", "skipped:"))
]
return report
def markdown(rep: dict) -> str:
"""Human/agent-readable block for pasting into the per-recipe upgrade log."""
L = [f"### Advisory scan (deterministic pre-step) — {rep['recipe']} "
f"{rep.get('from') or '?'}{rep.get('to') or '?'}"]
if not rep.get("count_known", True):
L.append("\n**CVEs fixed by this upgrade: UNKNOWN — the scan could NOT determine a count.**")
L.append("\n⚠ This is NOT zero. A version-scheme change (e.g. semver → calver) makes numeric "
"ordering meaningless across this jump, so no advisory could be classified. Render "
"this recipe's cve cell as `?`, never `0`. Read the vendor's release notes for the "
"jump and count by hand.")
if rep["unclassified"]:
L.append(f"\nAdvisories seen but unclassifiable ({len(rep['unclassified'])}) — includes "
f"other images in this recipe: " + ", ".join(rep["unclassified"][:12]))
if rep["sources_failed"]:
L.append(f"\n⚠ sources that FAILED: {', '.join(rep['sources_failed'])}")
L.append(f"\n_Sources checked: {len(rep['sources'])} ({rep['registry_urls']} registry URLs + "
f"advisory APIs). This scan is ADDITIVE — it does not replace the release-note "
f"reading in the upgrade step._")
return "\n".join(L)
if rep["fixed_by_this_upgrade"]:
L.append(f"\n**CVEs fixed by this upgrade: {rep['cve_count_fixed']}**\n")
cb = rep.get("classified_by") or {}
if isinstance(cb, dict) and cb:
for src, method in cb.items():
dw = (rep.get("date_window") or {}).get(src)
win = (rep.get("windows") or {}).get(src, {})
span = f"{win.get('from')}{win.get('to')}"
extra = (f" (dates {dw['from'][:10]}{dw['to'][:10]})" if dw else "")
L.append(f"_{src.split(':',1)[-1]}: {span} — counted by {method}{extra}._")
L.append("")
L.append("| CVE | severity | fixed in | advisory | source |")
L.append("|---|---|---|---|---|")
for cve in rep["fixed_by_this_upgrade"]:
e = rep["cves"][cve]
L.append(f"| {cve} | {e.get('severity') or '?'} | {e.get('patched') or '?'} | "
f"{e.get('ghsa') or '-'} | {e['sources'][0]} |")
else:
L.append("\n**CVEs fixed by this upgrade: 0 identified by the deterministic scan.**")
if rep["unclassified"]:
L.append(f"\nSeen but not version-classified ({len(rep['unclassified'])}) — includes advisories "
f"from OTHER images in this recipe (sidecars), which this window cannot judge: "
+ ", ".join(rep["unclassified"][:12]))
if rep["sources_failed"]:
L.append(f"\n⚠ sources that FAILED (treat counts as incomplete): {', '.join(rep['sources_failed'])}")
L.append(f"\n_Sources checked: {len(rep['sources'])} "
f"({rep['registry_urls']} registry URLs + advisory APIs). This scan is ADDITIVE — it does "
f"not replace the release-note reading in the upgrade step._")
return "\n".join(L)
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter)
ap.add_argument("recipe")
ap.add_argument("--from", dest="v_from", default=None)
ap.add_argument("--to", dest="v_to", default=None)
ap.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="emit raw JSON instead of markdown")
ap.add_argument("--registry", default=REGISTRY_DIR)
ap.add_argument("--window", action="append", default=[], metavar="KEY=FROM:TO",
help="extra image window, e.g. --window redis=7.4:8.10 (repeatable). "
"KEY matches a source repo name; its advisories are then counted "
"against ITS OWN bump instead of being left unclassified.")
a = ap.parse_args()
wins = []
for w in a.window:
key, _, rng = w.partition('=')
wf, _, wt = rng.partition(':')
if key and wf and wt:
wins.append((key, wf, wt))
else:
print(f'ignoring malformed --window {w!r} (expected KEY=FROM:TO)', file=sys.stderr)
rep = scan(a.recipe, a.v_from, a.v_to, a.registry, wins)
print(json.dumps(rep, indent=2) if a.json else markdown(rep))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())