feat(cfold): canonicalize custom test layout
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autonomic-bot
2026-06-12 16:08:18 +00:00
parent 87928a9096
commit 44e02425ab
110 changed files with 306 additions and 241 deletions
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"""lasuite-drive — parity port of recipe-maintainer's health_check.py (Phase 2 P2).
SOURCE: references/recipe-maintainer/recipe-info/lasuite-drive/tests/health_check.py
The original asserted HTTP 200 from `https://lasuite-drive.<DOMAIN_SUFFIX>`. The cc-ci port
preserves the assertion shape — non-error HTTP from the served root — adapted to the ephemeral
per-run domain via the `live_app` fixture. Runs in the custom tier against the shared post-install
live deployment.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "..", "runner"))
from harness import http as harness_http # noqa: E402
def test_lasuite_drive_returns_200(live_app):
"""Parity with recipe-info/lasuite-drive/tests/health_check.py: HTTP 200 from `/`."""
url = f"https://{live_app}/"
# accept 200 (frontend SPA shell) — Drive serves the SPA at root unauthenticated;
# the SPA itself bootstraps via /api/v1.0/users/me/ which requires OIDC (separate test).
status, _ = harness_http.retry_http_get(
url, expect_status=(200, 301, 302), max_wait=60, interval=3
)
assert status in (
200,
301,
302,
), f"lasuite-drive at {url} returned HTTP {status} (expected 200/301/302)"
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"""lasuite-drive — Q3.2 recipe-specific functional test (plan §4.3: "upload a file to a workspace,
list/download it; MinIO bucket present").
Drive stores all uploaded documents in MinIO (S3) — the `minio` service, bucket `drive-media-storage`
(created by the `minio-createbuckets` one-shot, versioning enabled). This exercises that storage
backend end-to-end at the S3 layer: it (1) confirms the bucket exists, and (2) does a real
upload → list → download round-trip and asserts the bytes survive.
It runs `mc` (bundled in the minio/minio image) INSIDE the `minio` service container, authenticating
with the in-container root creds (`/run/secrets/minio_{ru,rp}`) — the same path the recipe's own
createbuckets job uses. No dep on keycloak, so it runs on the base deploy regardless of SSO state.
NOT health-only: a drive whose object store is missing the bucket, or that can't persist/serve an
object, fails here even though the SPA at `/` returns 200.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
import uuid
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "..", "runner"))
from harness import lifecycle # noqa: E402
BUCKET = "drive-media-storage"
def _mc(domain: str, script: str) -> str:
"""Run an `mc` shell script inside the minio container (root creds from /run/secrets)."""
prelude = (
"set -e; "
"U=$(cat /run/secrets/minio_ru); P=$(cat /run/secrets/minio_rp); "
'mc alias set ccci http://localhost:9000 "$U" "$P" >/dev/null 2>&1; '
)
return lifecycle.exec_in_app(domain, ["sh", "-c", prelude + script], service="minio")
def test_minio_bucket_present_and_object_roundtrip(live_app):
domain = live_app # per-run drive app domain
# 1) The drive media bucket exists (mc ls returns 0; set -e raises otherwise).
_mc(domain, f"mc ls ccci/{BUCKET} >/dev/null")
# 2) Real upload -> list -> download round-trip with a unique marker.
marker = f"ccci-drive-probe-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
key = f"ccci-probe/{marker}.txt"
out = _mc(
domain,
# upload via stdin; list the object; read it back (tagged); then delete.
f'printf %s "{marker}" | mc pipe ccci/{BUCKET}/{key} >/dev/null 2>&1; '
f"mc ls ccci/{BUCKET}/{key}; "
f'echo "READBACK:$(mc cat ccci/{BUCKET}/{key})"; '
f"mc rm ccci/{BUCKET}/{key} >/dev/null 2>&1",
)
# The object was listed (its key appears) and its content round-tripped intact.
assert f"{marker}.txt" in out, f"uploaded object not listed in bucket: {out!r}"
assert (
f"READBACK:{marker}" in out
), f"object content did not round-trip through MinIO; got: {out!r}"
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"""lasuite-drive — Q3.2 SSO-flow test (operator-2026-05-28 SSO-dep plan).
Drive (La Suite Drive) is OIDC-required: login is gated by an external OpenID Connect provider.
Mirrors the proven lasuite-docs SSO model:
- The orchestrator deploys a per-run keycloak dep AFTER the generic tiers and provisions a fresh
realm/client/user via `harness.sso.setup_keycloak_realm`; `install_steps.sh` then wires the
OIDC env + client secret into the running drive app and redeploys. Creds land in `$CCCI_DEPS_FILE`
(read here via the `deps` fixture).
- This test consumes those creds and exercises the real OIDC flow against the dep keycloak: discovery
endpoint advertises the realm, and a password grant yields a valid JWT with the expected claims.
- Marked `@pytest.mark.requires_deps` so if dep provisioning failed the test SKIPs with a clear
`deps-not-ready` reason — and (per F2-11) the orchestrator then fails the run rather than going
green on a skipped SSO test.
SOURCE: adapted from tests/lasuite-docs/custom/test_oidc_with_keycloak.py (Q2.4 acceptance).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import json
import os
import re
import sys
import time
import pytest
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "..", "runner"))
from harness import sso # noqa: E402
def _b64url_decode(seg: str) -> bytes:
pad = "=" * ((4 - len(seg) % 4) % 4)
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(seg + pad)
@pytest.mark.requires_deps
def test_oidc_password_grant_against_dep_keycloak(live_app, deps):
"""The dep keycloak issues a JWT for the pre-provisioned test user via OIDC password grant."""
assert "keycloak" in deps, (
f"keycloak creds not in deps; got {list(deps.keys())}. "
"dep provisioning should have populated this."
)
kc = deps["keycloak"]
# Creds shape. WC1: realm is per-run namespaced "<parent>-<6hex>"; client_id stays the parent.
assert kc["domain"]
assert re.fullmatch(
r"lasuite-drive-[0-9a-f]{6}", kc["realm"]
), f"realm {kc['realm']!r} not the per-run namespaced form lasuite-drive-<6hex>"
assert kc["client_id"] == "lasuite-drive"
assert isinstance(kc["client_secret"], str) and len(kc["client_secret"]) >= 16
assert isinstance(kc["password"], str) and len(kc["password"]) >= 16
creds = {
"provider": "keycloak",
"provider_domain": kc["domain"],
"realm": kc["realm"],
"client_id": kc["client_id"],
"client_secret": kc["client_secret"],
"user": kc["user"],
"password": kc["password"],
"email": kc["email"],
"discovery_url": kc["discovery_url"],
"token_url": kc["token_url"],
"auth_url": kc["auth_url"],
"userinfo_url": kc["userinfo_url"],
}
# OIDC discovery endpoint advertises the realm
discovery = sso.assert_discovery_endpoint(creds)
expected_iss = f"https://{kc['domain']}/realms/{kc['realm']}"
assert discovery.get("issuer") == expected_iss
assert discovery.get("token_endpoint", "").startswith(expected_iss + "/")
assert discovery.get("authorization_endpoint", "").startswith(expected_iss + "/")
# Password grant → real JWT
token = sso.oidc_password_grant(creds)
assert isinstance(token, str) and token.count(".") == 2, f"access_token is not a JWT: {token!r}"
payload = json.loads(_b64url_decode(token.split(".")[1]))
assert payload.get("iss") == expected_iss, f"JWT iss={payload.get('iss')!r} != {expected_iss!r}"
assert (
payload.get("azp") == kc["client_id"]
), f"JWT azp={payload.get('azp')!r} != {kc['client_id']!r}"
assert payload.get("typ") == "Bearer", f"JWT typ={payload.get('typ')!r} != 'Bearer'"
exp = payload.get("exp")
assert (
isinstance(exp, int) and exp > time.time()
), f"JWT exp={exp!r} not a future timestamp (now={time.time():.0f})"