feat(2): Q3.1 partial — lasuite-docs PARITY + health_check + auth_required (Q2.4 still passes)
- tests/lasuite-docs/PARITY.md: parity table for health_check.py (ported); oidc_login.py + upload_conversion.py documented as Q3.1 follow-up needing OIDC env wiring; ≥2 recipe-specific tests rationale (test_oidc_with_keycloak + test_auth_required). - tests/lasuite-docs/functional/test_health_check.py: parity port of recipe-info/lasuite-docs/tests/health_check.py — HTTP 200/301/302 from root. - tests/lasuite-docs/functional/test_auth_required.py: NEW recipe-specific — GET /api/v1.0/users/me/ asserts 401/403 (auth required). Non-vacuous: distinguishes correctly-wired OIDC gate from anonymous access (200), missing route (404), broken (5xx). The Q2.4 acceptance test (test_oidc_with_keycloak.py) continues to verify the dep resolver + SSO harness against the per-run keycloak dep (F2-5 fix verified cold; see ccci-f25-verify.log). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tests/lasuite-docs/functional/test_auth_required.py
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tests/lasuite-docs/functional/test_auth_required.py
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"""lasuite-docs — recipe-specific functional test (Phase 2 P3, ≥2 beyond parity).
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The defining property of lasuite-docs as configured by the recipe is that its **backend API is
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auth-protected** — OIDC tokens authorize access; anonymous requests are rejected. This test
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proves the auth middleware is wired correctly: a sample backend endpoint (`/api/v1.0/users/me/`)
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returns 401 Unauthorized without a token. Non-vacuous: a misconfigured backend serving anonymous
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access would return 200; a broken auth middleware would return 500; a wrong route would return
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404 — only a correctly-wired OIDC gate returns 401.
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Distinct from the OIDC password-grant test against the keycloak dep (`test_oidc_with_keycloak`):
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this proves **lasuite-docs's** own auth posture; that test proves the **SSO provider** can issue
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tokens. Together they exercise both sides of the OIDC flow's plumbing.
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Runs in the custom tier against the shared post-install deployment.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "..", "runner"))
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from harness import http as harness_http # noqa: E402
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def test_users_me_requires_auth(live_app):
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"""GET /api/v1.0/users/me/ without a Bearer token must return 401, not 200/404/500."""
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url = f"https://{live_app}/api/v1.0/users/me/"
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# Retry with broad acceptance: any 4xx (or specific 401) indicates the route exists + auth is
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# required. Reject 200 (anonymous access) and 5xx (broken backend).
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status, _ = harness_http.retry_http_get(
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url, expect_status=(401, 403), max_wait=60, interval=3
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)
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assert status in (401, 403), (
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f"GET {url} returned {status}, expected 401 (auth required). "
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f"200 = anonymous access leaked; 404 = route missing; 5xx = backend broken."
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)
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