style: repo-wide lint pass — make the lint gate green again
Push builds have been RED on the lint step since ~build 209 from accumulated formatting drift. This is the mechanical cleanup: ruff format + ruff --fix (UP038 isinstance unions, SIM105 contextlib.suppress, UP031 f-strings, SIM115 tempfile context manager), shfmt -i 2 -ci, nixpkgs-fmt/statix/deadnix (merged attrsets, dropped unused lib args), yamllint, and shell quoting fixes in tests/lasuite-docs/setup_custom_tests.sh. No behaviour changes intended; lint: PASS, unit tests: 138 passed.
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@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ def test_create_confidential_client_and_obtain_token(live_app):
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"clientId": client_id,
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"enabled": True,
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"secret": client_secret,
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"publicClient": False, # confidential client
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"serviceAccountsEnabled": True, # required for client_credentials grant
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"standardFlowEnabled": False, # not needed for service-account-only client
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"publicClient": False, # confidential client
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"serviceAccountsEnabled": True, # required for client_credentials grant
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"standardFlowEnabled": False, # not needed for service-account-only client
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"directAccessGrantsEnabled": False,
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"protocol": "openid-connect",
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}
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@ -144,25 +144,25 @@ def test_create_confidential_client_and_obtain_token(live_app):
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# Use the client to obtain its own token (client_credentials grant)
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tok_status, tok_resp = _client_credentials_token(live_app, client_id, client_secret)
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assert tok_status == 200, (
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f"client_credentials token returned HTTP {tok_status}: {tok_resp!r}"
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)
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assert (
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tok_status == 200
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), f"client_credentials token returned HTTP {tok_status}: {tok_resp!r}"
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access_token = tok_resp.get("access_token") if isinstance(tok_resp, dict) else None
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assert isinstance(access_token, str) and access_token.count(".") == 2, (
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f"client_credentials access_token not a JWT: {access_token!r}"
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)
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assert (
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isinstance(access_token, str) and access_token.count(".") == 2
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), f"client_credentials access_token not a JWT: {access_token!r}"
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# Decode the JWT payload; assert azp matches the new client
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payload = json.loads(_b64url_decode(access_token.split(".")[1]))
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assert payload.get("azp") == client_id, (
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f"client_credentials JWT azp={payload.get('azp')!r} != client_id={client_id!r}"
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)
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assert (
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payload.get("azp") == client_id
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), f"client_credentials JWT azp={payload.get('azp')!r} != client_id={client_id!r}"
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# Service-account token does NOT carry a session-scoped user (azp + clientId differ from
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# admin-cli token). The presence of azp + iss == per-run-domain proves the issuance flow.
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expected_iss = f"https://{live_app}/realms/master"
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assert payload.get("iss") == expected_iss, (
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f"JWT iss={payload.get('iss')!r} != {expected_iss!r}"
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)
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assert (
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payload.get("iss") == expected_iss
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), f"JWT iss={payload.get('iss')!r} != {expected_iss!r}"
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finally:
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# Idempotent cleanup
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if cleanup_id:
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