test(lasuite-docs): update stale OIDC tests for impress v5.4.0 Bearer-auth removal

test_oidc_login_via_keycloak and test_create_doc_and_read_back authenticated with
'Authorization: Bearer <password-grant JWT>'; impress v5.4.0 removed Bearer/JWT
auth on the API (SessionAuthentication only), so both went RED with 401 on the
v5.4.1 upgrade.

Updated to the successor auth path: a new recipe-local _oidc_session.py drives the
real OIDC authorization-code flow (app -> keycloak login form -> callback ->
Django session cookie, with CSRF headers on unsafe methods).
- test_oidc_login: still asserts the unauth challenge redirect; NOW also asserts a
  raw Bearer JWT is REJECTED (401/403 - the v5.4.0 hardening, asserted as the new
  correct behavior); then asserts the session-authenticated whoami returns the
  provisioned user. No assertion weakened - the auth proof is stronger than before.
- test_create_doc: same create+read-back round-trip assertions, now over the
  session-authenticated API.

Stale-test fix for recipe PR
recipe-maintainers/lasuite-docs#7
(carry-over from /upgrade-all 2026-07-24).

tests/lasuite-docs/custom/test_oidc_login.py

@@ -2,13 +2,16 @@
 
 SOURCE: references/recipe-maintainer/recipe-info/lasuite-docs/tests/oidc_login.py
 
-End-to-end flow:
+End-to-end flow (updated for impress v5.4.0, which REMOVED Bearer/JWT auth on the API —
+the app now only accepts its own session cookie from the OIDC authorization-code flow):
 1. GET `/api/v1.0/users/me/` without auth → asserts the response REDIRECTS to the dep
    keycloak's realm auth endpoint (the recipe is correctly configured to challenge
    unauthenticated callers — wired via install_steps.sh).
-2. Obtain an OIDC token from the dep keycloak via password grant
-   (the test user provisioned by the orchestrator's realm setup).
-3. Call `/api/v1.0/users/me/` with `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>` → asserts 200 and the
+2. Obtain an OIDC token from the dep keycloak via password grant, and assert the API
+   now REJECTS it as a Bearer credential (the v5.4.0 auth hardening — a 200 here would
+   mean the hardening regressed).
+3. Log in via the real OIDC authorization-code flow (app → keycloak form → callback →
+   session cookie) and call `/api/v1.0/users/me/` with the session → asserts 200 and the
    returned user's email matches the provisioned test user.
 
 Marked @pytest.mark.requires_deps — skips with `deps-not-ready` if dep provisioning failed.
@@ -24,9 +27,11 @@ import urllib.request
 
 import pytest
 
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(__file__))
 sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "..", "runner"))
+from _oidc_session import OidcSession  # noqa: E402  (recipe-local helper, same dir)
 from harness import http as harness_http  # noqa: E402
-from harness import sso
+from harness import sso  # noqa: E402
 
 _CTX = ssl.create_default_context()
 _CTX.check_hostname = False
@@ -62,16 +67,18 @@ def test_oidc_login_via_keycloak(live_app, deps):
     # 302 redirect. Both are valid "auth-required" indicators — accept either, but if a
     # redirect is returned it must point at the dep keycloak realm.
     if status in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
-        assert expected_prefix in (
-            redirect or ""
-        ), f"Docs redirected to {redirect!r}, expected to start with {expected_prefix!r}"
+        assert expected_prefix in (redirect or ""), (
+            f"Docs redirected to {redirect!r}, expected to start with {expected_prefix!r}"
+        )
     else:
         assert status in (401, 403), (
             f"GET /api/v1.0/users/me/ unauth: HTTP {status}; expected redirect to keycloak "
             f"OR 401/403. (200 would be an auth leak.)"
         )
 
-    # Step 2: obtain an OIDC token via password grant against the dep keycloak
+    # Step 2: obtain an OIDC token via password grant against the dep keycloak, and assert
+    # the API REJECTS it as Bearer — impress v5.4.0 removed Bearer/JWT auth (SessionAuthentication
+    # only); a 200 here would mean the auth hardening regressed.
     creds = {
         "client_id": kc["client_id"],
         "client_secret": kc["client_secret"],
@@ -81,14 +88,19 @@ def test_oidc_login_via_keycloak(live_app, deps):
     }
     access_token = sso.oidc_password_grant(creds)
     assert isinstance(access_token, str) and access_token.count(".") == 2, "expected JWT"
-
-    # Step 3: call the protected API with the Bearer token; assert 200 + user email
     status, body = harness_http.http_get(
         f"https://{live_app}/api/v1.0/users/me/",
         headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"},
     )
-    assert status == 200, f"GET /api/v1.0/users/me/ with token HTTP {status}: {body!r}"
-    assert isinstance(body, dict), f"unexpected response: {body!r}"
-    assert (
-        body.get("email") == kc["email"]
-    ), f"unexpected user email: got {body.get('email')!r}, expected {kc['email']!r}"
+    assert status in (401, 403), (
+        f"GET /api/v1.0/users/me/ with a Bearer JWT returned HTTP {status} — impress >= v5.4.0 "
+        f"must reject raw Bearer tokens (got body {body!r})"
+    )
+
+    # Step 3: the successor auth path — real OIDC authorization-code login (session cookie);
+    # the session-authenticated whoami must return the provisioned user.
+    sess = OidcSession(f"https://{live_app}")
+    me = sess.login(kc["user"], kc["password"])
+    assert me.get("email") == kc["email"], (
+        f"unexpected user email: got {me.get('email')!r}, expected {kc['email']!r}"
+    )