# mailu — recipe-maintainer → cc-ci parity (Phase 2 P2) **P2 is VACUOUS for mailu:** there is no `recipe-info/mailu/tests/` corpus in the recipe-maintainer workspace (`/srv/recipe-maintainer`), so there are no recipe-maintainer tests to port. Coverage is therefore health + recipe-specific functional tests (P3), authored from what mailu *is* (a full email stack: nginx front + admin + postfix/smtp + dovecot/imap + rspamd/antispam + webmail + redis). ## cc-ci deployment notes - `COMPOSE_FILE=compose.yml` (base). recipe_meta.EXTRA_ENV(domain) pins `MAIL_DOMAIN`/`HOSTNAMES` to the per-run domain, `TRAEFIK_STACK_NAME=traefik_ci_commoninternet_net` (so the external `*_letsencrypt` volume the certdumper mounts resolves), and **`TLS_FLAVOR=notls`** — mailu's mail-port TLS normally comes from `certdumper` dumping traefik's ACME `acme.json`, but cc-ci uses a file-provider wildcard cert (no ACME), so there is no acme.json; `notls` removes that dependency. (certdumper still runs idle; harmless — it converges 1/1.) Web/admin is served over the real wildcard TLS via Traefik. Mail ports 25/465/587/110/143/993/995 are published mode:host → on-host (cc-ci-run) tests reach SMTP/IMAP at 127.0.0.1. ## Recipe-specific functional tests (P3 — ≥2) 1. `functional/test_mailbox.py` — §4.3 create-an-object + read-back: create a mailbox via the admin container's `flask mailu user` CLI, then read it back from `flask mailu config-export --json` and assert the address is present (admin-DB provisioning round-trip). 2. `functional/test_mail_flow.py` — the characteristic end-to-end mail flow: INJECT a uniquely-marked message to the mailbox via the postfix container's local `sendmail` (locally-originated → not greylisted), then VERIFY delivery+storage via dovecot's `doveadm search` in the imap container — a real postfix → rspamd → dovecot deliver/store/fetch round-trip. We use the in-container mail tools (not the host network ports) because TLS_FLAVOR=notls makes dovecot refuse plaintext auth over the network (143); the in-container path exercises the same delivery/storage stack. (A network IMAP-auth test was dropped: under notls dovecot disallows plaintext network auth, so a host-side login is not a meaningful signal here.) ## Backup data-integrity (P4) — N/A (recipe ships no backup config) The upstream mailu recipe declares **no `backupbot.backup` label** on any service, so the cc-ci backup/restore tiers cleanly SKIP (`backup_capable=False`). There is no recipe backup mechanism to exercise — P4 is genuinely N/A for mailu as published, not a cut corner. The durable fix (if P4 coverage is wanted) is a recipe-PR adding backupbot labels (mailu admin sqlite at /data + mail volume), filed as a deferral mirroring the immich Q3.5 / Q3.2b pattern — see DEFERRED.md. Pending Adversary §7.1 sign-off on the N/A. ## Browser flow (P6) Not added: mailu's user-facing UX (webmail/admin) is a standard web UI; the characteristic behaviour (mail send/receive, account auth) is covered functionally above. No Playwright flow owed.