# Secrets model & rotation (D6)

cc-ci handles three classes of secret in deliberately different ways (plan §4.4). **No plaintext
secret ever lives in git, logs, or the results UI** — only sops-encrypted ciphertext and
references-by-location. The Adversary's leak test greps published Drone logs + the dashboard for
known secret patterns and any generated app password; it must find nothing.

## Where secrets live (Phase-1c: a private companion repo)

All sops-encrypted secret material — including the **wildcard TLS cert+key** — lives in a **separate
private repo `recipe-maintainers/cc-ci-secrets`**, mounted into this repo as a **git submodule at
`secrets/`** (so the base resolves `secrets/secrets.yaml`). The base `cc-ci` repo holds **no secrets**,
only code/config + instance parameters; `secrets/.sops.yaml` (in the submodule) lists the two age
recipients: the **host key** (`age1h90ut…`, cc-ci's SSH host key via ssh-to-age) and the off-box
**master/recovery key** (`age1cmk26t…`; private half only at `/srv/cc-ci/.sops/master-age.txt` on the
build host / provisioned to a fresh host — never in either repo). Clone with `git clone --recursive`
(bot/deploy creds for the private submodule); build with `?submodules=1` (see docs/install.md).

## Decryption chain (sops-nix) — the ONE out-of-band secret

- **Bootstrap age key (the only secret not in git):** provisioned to `/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt`
  (0600) before the first rebuild. `sops.age.keyFile` points there; `sops.age.sshKeyPaths` also offers
  cc-ci's SSH host key. On the canonical cc-ci the keyFile holds the host-derived age identity
  (`ssh-to-age -private-key -i /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key`, == the `host` recipient); on a
  fresh/cloned host whose SSH key is NOT a recipient (e.g. the throwaway rebuild), it holds the
  **recovery key** — so any host decrypts every secret. (sops-install-secrets aborts if a configured
  keyFile is missing, so it must exist before `nixos-rebuild`.)
- `sops-nix` decrypts at activation into `/run/secrets/<name>` (ramfs, mode 0400 root). The wildcard
  cert/key are placed at `/var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain,privkey}.pem` (symlinks → /run/secrets) via
  `sops.secrets.<name>.path` — the path traefik reads (no out-of-band cert file).
- Swarm services don't read `/run/secrets` directly; the reconcile oneshots copy each into a **docker
  swarm secret** which the service mounts. abra-managed apps use `abra app secret …`.

## Class A1 — external inputs (operator-provided; the loop CANNOT create them)

| Secret | Location | Rotation |
|---|---|---|
| Tailscale auth key | `/srv/cc-ci/.testenv` (sandbox) | operator re-issues; re-run `tailscale up` |
| cc-ci SSH root key | `~/.ssh/cc-ci-root-ed25519` (sandbox) | operator re-keys `authorized_keys` |
| Gitea bot creds | `/srv/cc-ci/.testenv` (`GITEA_USERNAME/PASSWORD`) | operator resets; update `.testenv` |
| **Bootstrap age key** | host `/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt` (0600) — **the one out-of-band secret** | host-derived (cc-ci) or recovery key (clone); re-provision on host re-key |
| **Wildcard TLS cert+key** | sops in **`cc-ci-secrets`** → decrypted to `/var/lib/ci-certs/live/` | operator re-issues then **commits the new cert into `cc-ci-secrets`** (see below) |
| Registry pull creds (if needed) | sops `cc-ci-secrets/secrets.yaml` | operator-provided |

A missing/invalid A1 secret is a `## Blocked` condition — the agent never invents or works around it,
and **never** runs ACME/DNS-01 for commoninternet.net. (Phase-1c: the cert is now *committed encrypted*
in `cc-ci-secrets`, not dropped as a file — but issuance is still operator-only; the Gandi token never
touches the repo or the box.)

**Wildcard cert rotation (operator; the cert now lives in git):**
1. Operator re-issues the SAN cert (`*.ci.commoninternet.net` + `ci.commoninternet.net`) out-of-band
   (LE DNS-01/Gandi, ~90d, next ~2026-08-24).
2. Re-encrypt it into the secrets repo: `sops cc-ci-secrets/secrets.yaml` and replace
   `wildcard_cert` / `wildcard_key` (each a PEM block scalar); commit + push `cc-ci-secrets`, bump the
   base submodule pointer.
3. `nixos-rebuild switch`: sops re-writes `/var/lib/ci-certs/live/*` from git; the proxy reconcile
   re-inserts the swarm secret + redeploys traefik. One cert covers every per-run subdomain (SNI).

## Class A2 — internal infra secrets (the loop GENERATES + manages; never a blocker)

All sops-encrypted in `secrets/secrets.yaml`, decrypted to `/run/secrets/<name>`:

| Secret | Used by | Generate |
|---|---|---|
| `drone_rpc_secret` | Drone server ↔ exec runner RPC | `openssl rand -hex 32` |
| `drone_gitea_client_secret` | Drone↔Gitea OAuth app | from the Gitea OAuth app creation |
| `bridge_webhook_hmac` | comment-bridge webhook HMAC | `openssl rand -hex 32` |
| `bridge_drone_token` | bridge + dashboard → Drone API | hex token; **injected as the bot's Drone machine token** via `DRONE_USER_CREATE=…,token:$(cat /run/secrets/bridge_drone_token)` (nix/modules/drone.nix) so it's reproducible on a fresh Drone DB (else the bridge gets 401 on a clean-room rebuild) |
| `bridge_gitea_token` | bridge → Gitea API (poll/comment) | minted Gitea token (bot) |
| `restic_password` | backup-bot-two restic repo | **abra-generated** (`abra app secret generate`, kept stable across reconciles) |

**Rotate an A2 secret** (e.g. `bridge_webhook_hmac`):
1. Have an age identity that is a recipient (the host key via ssh-to-age, or the recovery key).
2. In the **`cc-ci-secrets`** submodule: `sops secrets.yaml` → replace the value (or
   `openssl rand -hex 32`), save (re-encrypts to both recipients per its `.sops.yaml`); commit + push
   `cc-ci-secrets`, then bump the base repo's submodule pointer (`git add secrets && commit`).
3. For swarm-secret-backed values, **bump the consuming app's secret version** so the reconcile
   re-creates the swarm secret (docker swarm secrets are immutable): e.g. drone `RPC_SECRET_VERSION`
   v1→v2 (nix/modules/drone.nix), bridge `cc_ci_bridge_*_v<n>` (nix/modules/bridge.nix). Update both ends
   (server + runner share `drone_rpc_secret`).
4. `git commit` + push, sync to host, `nixos-rebuild switch` → reconcile re-inserts + redeploys.
5. Verify: the consuming service is healthy and re-auth works (e.g. a fresh build triggers).

**Re-key sops recipients** (e.g. cc-ci host re-provisioned → new host age key): add the new
`age1…` to `cc-ci-secrets/.sops.yaml`, `sops updatekeys secrets.yaml` (run with the master identity),
commit `cc-ci-secrets` + bump the submodule pointer. The master/recovery key lets you re-encrypt even
if the host key is lost — and is itself the bootstrap key a fresh host uses (`/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt`).

## Class B — recipe app secrets (the harness generates per run; NEVER a blocker)

- **Generated at install:** `abra app secret generate <app> --all` (+ any deterministic test fixtures
  the harness chooses) when the recipe deploys.
- **Persisted for the run:** the same generated values survive install → upgrade → backup/restore
  because abra/swarm holds them keyed by the per-run app name (`<recipe[:4]>-<6hex>`); the harness
  re-reads them between stages. Concurrent runs are isolated by the unique per-run app name (and
  MAX_TESTS=1 means no concurrency anyway).
- **Destroyed at teardown:** the same teardown that removes the app/volumes runs
  `abra app secret remove <app> --all` (+ docker-secret cleanup by stack name as a fallback). Nothing
  generated for a run outlives it.

## No-plaintext guarantees

- Secrets are referenced by `/run/secrets/<name>` path or read inline (e.g.
  `PGPASSWORD=$(cat /run/secrets/…)` *inside* the app container), never printed by the harness.
- abra does not echo generated secret values; reconciles redirect secret-generate stdout to
  `/dev/null`.
- The results dashboard renders run status only (no log bodies); per-run logs live in Drone's UI.
- Adversary leak test: greps published Drone logs + the dashboard for the known infra-secret values
  and any generated app password → must be zero. (Baseline + recipe-CI log scans: clean.)