"""lasuite-docs — parity port of recipe-maintainer's oidc_login.py (Phase 2 P2). SOURCE: references/recipe-maintainer/recipe-info/lasuite-docs/tests/oidc_login.py End-to-end flow (updated for impress v5.4.0, which REMOVED Bearer/JWT auth on the API — the app now only accepts its own session cookie from the OIDC authorization-code flow): 1. GET `/api/v1.0/users/me/` without auth → asserts the response REDIRECTS to the dep keycloak's realm auth endpoint (the recipe is correctly configured to challenge unauthenticated callers — wired via install_steps.sh). 2. Obtain an OIDC token from the dep keycloak via password grant, and assert the API now REJECTS it as a Bearer credential (the v5.4.0 auth hardening — a 200 here would mean the hardening regressed). 3. Log in via the real OIDC authorization-code flow (app → keycloak form → callback → session cookie) and call `/api/v1.0/users/me/` with the session → asserts 200 and the returned user's email matches the provisioned test user. Marked @pytest.mark.requires_deps — skips with `deps-not-ready` if dep provisioning failed. """ from __future__ import annotations import os import ssl import sys import urllib.error import urllib.request import pytest sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(__file__)) sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "..", "runner")) from _oidc_session import OidcSession # noqa: E402 (recipe-local helper, same dir) from harness import http as harness_http # noqa: E402 from harness import sso # noqa: E402 _CTX = ssl.create_default_context() _CTX.check_hostname = False _CTX.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE class _NoFollow(urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler): def redirect_request(self, req, fp, code, msg, headers, newurl): raise urllib.error.HTTPError(newurl, code, msg, headers, fp) def _get_no_redirect(url: str) -> tuple[int, str]: """GET without auto-following redirects. Returns (status, redirect_url-or-body).""" opener = urllib.request.build_opener(_NoFollow, urllib.request.HTTPSHandler(context=_CTX)) try: with opener.open(url, timeout=15) as resp: return resp.status, resp.read().decode(errors="replace") except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: if e.code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308): return e.code, e.headers.get("Location", "") return e.code, "" @pytest.mark.requires_deps def test_oidc_login_via_keycloak(live_app, deps): """Anonymous → redirect to keycloak; password-grant token → 200 from /api/v1.0/users/me/.""" kc = deps["keycloak"] # Step 1: unauthenticated GET → 302 to keycloak realm's auth endpoint status, redirect = _get_no_redirect(f"https://{live_app}/api/v1.0/users/me/") expected_prefix = f"https://{kc['domain']}/realms/{kc['realm']}/protocol/openid-connect/auth" # Some configurations return 401 with WWW-Authenticate (an OIDC challenge) rather than a # 302 redirect. Both are valid "auth-required" indicators — accept either, but if a # redirect is returned it must point at the dep keycloak realm. if status in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308): assert expected_prefix in (redirect or ""), ( f"Docs redirected to {redirect!r}, expected to start with {expected_prefix!r}" ) else: assert status in (401, 403), ( f"GET /api/v1.0/users/me/ unauth: HTTP {status}; expected redirect to keycloak " f"OR 401/403. (200 would be an auth leak.)" ) # Step 2: obtain an OIDC token via password grant against the dep keycloak, and assert # the API REJECTS it as Bearer — impress v5.4.0 removed Bearer/JWT auth (SessionAuthentication # only); a 200 here would mean the auth hardening regressed. creds = { "client_id": kc["client_id"], "client_secret": kc["client_secret"], "user": kc["user"], "password": kc["password"], "token_url": kc["token_url"], } access_token = sso.oidc_password_grant(creds) assert isinstance(access_token, str) and access_token.count(".") == 2, "expected JWT" status, body = harness_http.http_get( f"https://{live_app}/api/v1.0/users/me/", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"}, ) assert status in (401, 403), ( f"GET /api/v1.0/users/me/ with a Bearer JWT returned HTTP {status} — impress >= v5.4.0 " f"must reject raw Bearer tokens (got body {body!r})" ) # Step 3: the successor auth path — real OIDC authorization-code login (session cookie); # the session-authenticated whoami must return the provisioned user. sess = OidcSession(f"https://{live_app}") me = sess.login(kc["user"], kc["password"]) assert me.get("email") == kc["email"], ( f"unexpected user email: got {me.get('email')!r}, expected {kc['email']!r}" )