# JOURNAL — phase `redfix`

## 2026-06-17T23:20Z — Bootstrap

Read phase plan + plan.md §6.1/§7/§9 + canon DECISIONS exceptions (lines ~1494–1552). Six
canon-sweep failures to investigate. Confirmed cc-ci access, no run in flight, sweep timer next
fires 2026-06-21 (3-day window), disk 38G free.

Isolation mechanism understood: `runner/nightly_sweep.run_on_tag` = `abra.recipe_checkout(r, tag)` +
`run_recipe_ci.py RECIPE=<r> CCCI_SKIP_FETCH=1` cold/full. I reproduce each failure by running ONE
recipe at a time with no concurrent load.

Starting canonical state notable: **mumble canonical IS present** (`1.0.0+v1.6.870-0`, written
20260617T180501Z — during today's nixenv sweep). The canon DECISIONS recorded mumble RED
(`test_handshake_completes_with_channel_presence`). A canonical only gets written on a GREEN cold run
on latest → mumble flipped green in a recent run. Strong early evidence for the operator's "mumble
passed before" → load flake hypothesis. Must confirm with a clean isolation re-run + check whether the
canon-sweep red was under concurrent load.

Next: start M1 investigation. Plan order (cheap/informative first): triage the existing sweep logs on
cc-ci to pin the EXACT assertion/error for each (mumble, mattermost-lts restore, gitea app.ini,
bluesky routing, discourse compose), then run isolation re-runs. discourse's recorded cause is an
UPSTREAM compose defect (`sidekiq.depends_on: discourse` while service is `app`) that FATAs before any
deploy — that's deterministic, not a load timeout, so it may not even need a long isolation run to
confirm; verify the compose at the latest tag directly first.

## 2026-06-17T23:40Z — M1: discourse isolation run — CANON ROOT-CAUSE WAS WRONG

Ran discourse ALONE on cc-ci (`recipe_checkout discourse 0.8.1+3.5.0` + `RECIPE=discourse
CCCI_SKIP_FETCH=1 cc-ci-run runner/run_recipe_ci.py`, log `/tmp/redfix-discourse.log`).

RESULT: **install PASS, upgrade FAIL, backup PASS, restore PASS, custom PASS** — the recipe deploys,
serves (200 /srv/status), backs up and restores cleanly. NOT a deploy timeout, NOT a 51-min wedge,
NOT a deploy FATA. The canon DECISIONS root-cause ("`abra app deploy` FATAs: service sidekiq depends
on undefined service discourse → invalid compose project") is **misattributed**: that string appears
ONLY from the non-fatal prepull `docker compose config --images` (rc=15, harness logs "skipping
(deploy will pull as usual)"). The real `abra app deploy` is a swarm `docker stack deploy`, which
ignores `depends_on` entirely → the stack converges (`UpdateStatus=completed`).

The ONLY failure is the cc-ci upgrade OVERLAY `tests/discourse/test_upgrade.py`:
- `test_head_runs_official_image_not_bitnamilegacy` — app image is `bitnamilegacy/discourse:3.5.0`;
  test demands `discourse/discourse:3.5.3` (official).
- `test_sidekiq_service_dropped_by_head` — services `['app','db','redis','sidekiq']`; test demands
  sidekiq dropped.

These `prevb`-phase overlay tests are PR-FAITHFULNESS assertions for a specific migration PR
(bitnamilegacy → official `discourse/discourse:3.5.3`, drop sidekiq). Verified that migration exists
in **NO upstream release tag and NOT in main** — `git show main:compose.yml` and every tag
(`0.1.0…0.8.1+3.5.0`) all use `bitnamilegacy/discourse:3.5.0` + sidekiq. So the overlay asserts a
state that doesn't exist anywhere upstream → deterministic RED whenever the sweep tests the latest
release tag. The head DID deploy (chaos-version label = head f87c612d+U, converged) — the test
expectation is simply wrong for the released recipe.

Note (M2 design): migrating discourse from the deprecated `bitnamilegacy` image to official
`discourse/discourse` is a MAJOR recipe rewrite (different fs layout, entrypoint, no `/opt/bitnami`
sidekiq run.sh) — not a 1-line image swap. So the overlay test's `discourse/discourse:3.5.3`
expectation may not be a realistic near-term recipe change. The bitnamilegacy deprecation is real
(bitnami sunset legacy images), so a migration is the right long-term direction, but the test as
written hard-codes a migration target absent upstream. Classification + fix approach to settle in M1
table / M2.

Classification: **stale/PR-specific cc-ci OVERLAY test mismatched to the canonical-sweep context**
(NOT a flake, NOT a load timeout, NOT a recipe-deploy defect, NOT warm-machinery). Teardown clean (no
discourse stack left). Evidence: `/tmp/redfix-discourse.log` on cc-ci; junit under
`/var/lib/cc-ci-runs/manual/junit/upgrade__cc-ci__test_upgrade.xml`.

## 2026-06-18T00:05Z — M1: mattermost-lts isolation run — DETERMINISTIC restore failure (recipe defect)

Ran mattermost-lts ALONE (tag 2.1.9+10.11.15, log /tmp/redfix-mattermost-lts.log).
RESULT: **install/upgrade/backup/custom PASS, restore FAIL** — identical to the canon failure:
`tests/mattermost-lts/test_restore.py::test_restore_returns_state` → `relation "ci_marker" does not
exist` after restore. So it is **deterministic in isolation, NOT a loaded-node race** (canon framing
was wrong). The marker logic is sound (postgres table seeded pre-backup, dropped pre-restore, asserted
post-restore — same pattern immich uses and PASSES).

ROOT CAUSE (recipe backup/restore labels). Compared mattermost-lts vs immich (immich passes the
IDENTICAL test):
- immich `database` svc: `backupbot.backup.pre-hook: /pg_backup.sh backup`,
  `backupbot.backup.volumes.postgres.path: backup.sql` (backs up ONLY the dump file), and
  **`backupbot.restore.post-hook: /pg_backup.sh restore`** (replays the dump on restore). → round-trips.
- mattermost-lts `postgres` svc: `pre-hook: pg_dump > /var/lib/postgresql/data/postgres-backup.sql`,
  `backup.path: /var/lib/postgresql/data/` (backs up the WHOLE live/hot PGDATA dir + the dump),
  `post-hook: rm .../postgres-backup.sql`, and **NO `backupbot.restore.post-hook`**. So on restore,
  abra restores the files but NOTHING replays the dump, and a hot-copied live PGDATA over a running
  postgres does not reload → `ci_marker` lost. Restore log confirms `Restoring Snapshot b0495d36 at /`
  with no post-hook reimport.

Classification: **GENUINE RECIPE DEFECT at latest** (postgres backup/restore does not round-trip —
missing restore post-hook + backs up hot PGDATA instead of dump-only). NOT a flake, NOT cc-ci test
weakening (test is correct & unmodified; immich proves the pattern works). Fix (M2) = recipe PR
adopting the immich-style postgres backup/restore (a `/pg_backup.sh`-style dump + restore post-hook).
Teardown clean (no matt stack). Evidence: /tmp/redfix-mattermost-lts.log; junit
restore__cc-ci__test_restore.xml.

Tooling note: my background "waiter" loop `while pgrep -f run_recipe_ci.py` self-matched (its own
cmdline contains the string) → never exited, falsely showed a run active. Use `pgrep -f
"[r]un_recipe_ci.py"` or match the python invocation. Killed the stuck waiters; node confirmed free.

## 2026-06-18T00:18Z — M1: mumble isolation run — GREEN (flake confirmed)

Ran mumble ALONE (tag 1.0.0+v1.6.870-0, log /tmp/redfix-mumble.log). RESULT: **ALL tiers PASS**
(install/upgrade/backup/restore/custom), including `custom/test_protocol_handshake.py::
test_handshake_completes_with_channel_presence` PASSED. No orphan stacks. The canon sweep recorded
this RED (`test_handshake…` failed under concurrent sweep load); it is GREEN here in isolation, and
its canonical was already written green TODAY (1.0.0+v1.6.870-0 @20260617T180501Z) under the lighter
nixenv sweep. → **load/timing FLAKE** on the control-channel handshake, NOT a recipe defect.

The handshake test already retries (`retry_handshake(attempts=12, interval=5.0)` = 60s). So the flake
is the voice server not completing the TLS+ServerSync handshake within ~60s under heavy concurrent
node load (deploy contention). M2 fix = harness stabilization (stronger readiness gate before the
custom tier / longer-or-smarter retry / serialize), based on the load failure mode. Classification:
**FLAKE (load/concurrency)** → harness stabilization.

Reproducibility: 1 green isolation run here + canonical green today + documented red under canon load.
Will do 1–2 more isolation repeats before the M1 claim to firm "reproducibly green in isolation."

## 2026-06-18T00:45Z — M1: bluesky-pds isolation run — 000 REPRODUCES; root cause = `app` DNS collision on shared proxy

Ran bluesky-pds ALONE (tag 0.3.0+v0.4.219, log /tmp/redfix-bluesky-pds.log). Cold lifecycle GREEN
(install/backup/restore/custom pass; upgrade EXPECTED_NA per recipe_meta — moving pds:0.4 tag). Then
WC5 promote-on-green-cold FAILED exactly as canon: `warm-bluesky-pds.ci.commoninternet.net: not
healthy over HTTPS /xrpc/_health (last status 0)`. So **the 000 reproduces deterministically in
isolation — NOT a sweep-load/ACME-rate-limit flake** (my first hypothesis, refuted).

LIVE DIAGNOSIS (stack left deployed by the failed promote; probed before teardown):
- app service 1/1, healthy: `docker exec app wget localhost:3000/xrpc/_health` → `{"version":"0.4.219"}`;
  app listens on `:::3000`; no restarts. So the PDS itself is fine.
- HTTPS to warm domain → 000. caddy logs flood:
  `tls "failed to get permission for on-demand certificate" domain=warm-bluesky-pds…
   error=… Get "http://app:3000/tls-check?domain=…": dial tcp 10.10.0.X:3000: connect: connection refused`
  (X varies: .2 .4 .5 .6 .8 .9 .10 .12).
- bluesky uses caddy **on-demand TLS** (Caddyfile: `on_demand_tls { ask http://app:3000/tls-check }`,
  `tls { on_demand }`, `reverse_proxy app:3000`). caddy must reach app:3000/tls-check to be GRANTED a
  cert before serving TLS. It can't → no cert → TLS handshake fails → 000.
- WHY can't caddy reach app: **service-name `app` collision on the shared `proxy` overlay.**
  - app is on `warm-bluesky-pds…_internal` ONLY (IP 10.0.3.3). caddy is on `proxy` (10.10.50.223) +
    `…_internal` (10.0.3.6).
  - `docker exec caddy getent hosts app` → returns ONLY proxy IPs (8/8 tries: 10.10.0.4/.5/.6/.10/.12),
    **NEVER the internal 10.0.3.3.** The proxy-net `app` alias shadows bluesky's own internal app.
  - `docker network inspect proxy` shows EVERY stack aliases its main service `app`:
    `drone…_app=10.10.0.2`, `traefik…_app=10.10.0.5`, `warm-keycloak…_app=10.10.0.9`,
    `ccci-reports/bridge/dashboard_app`, … — exactly the IPs caddy hits. None listens a PDS on 3000 →
    connection refused.
  So caddy resolves bare `app` to OTHER stacks' app endpoints on the shared proxy, never its own PDS.

WHY cold passes / warm fails: cold's health window is long (HTTP_TIMEOUT=600) and on first success
caddy CACHES the issued cert; the promote's shorter health window doesn't give caddy a chance to ever
resolve correctly (and here it provably never resolves to 10.0.3.3 at all). The collision is the root
cause; the promote machinery is CORRECT (it refused to write a canonical for an unhealthy 000 — no
canonical.json written, verified).

Classification: **genuine ROUTING/recipe defect — caddy↔app cross-stack `app`-alias collision on the
shared proxy net**, deterministic, reproducible in isolation. NOT a flake; NOT a promote-machinery bug.
Fix approach (M2): recipe PR giving the PDS service a UNIQUE name/alias (e.g. rename `app`→`pds`) so
caddy's `reverse_proxy`/`tls-check` resolve only bluesky's own internal service (no shared-proxy `app`
collision). (Alternatively a caddy-side internal-only resolution; renaming is cleanest.) Will confirm
the exact fix in M2 + verify the warm domain then serves 200.

Cleanup: removed orphaned warm-bluesky-pds stack + its volumes/secrets (promote had left it deployed;
no canonical written). Node clean.

## 2026-06-18T01:05Z — M1: keycloak — warm-domain namespace collision (harness), classification complete

keycloak was de-enrolled (WARM_CANONICAL=False) because its data-warm canonical domain would collide
with the LIVE-warm OIDC provider. Verified the collision STRUCTURALLY (code, no run needed):
- `canonical.canonical_domain(r)` → `warm.stable_domain(r)` → `f"warm-{r}.ci.commoninternet.net"`
  (runner/harness/canonical.py:42-44, warm.py:44-48).
- `warm.WARM_DOMAINS["keycloak"] = "warm-keycloak.ci.commoninternet.net"` (warm.py:27-29) — the
  always-on shared OIDC provider lasuite-*/drone consume for SSO; kept current by roll_warm_infra.
- So `canonical_domain("keycloak") == WARM_DOMAINS["keycloak"]` EXACTLY. Enrolling keycloak as a
  data-warm canonical → the sweep's promote deploy/teardown at warm-keycloak collides with the live
  provider. Confirmed live keycloak healthy (200 /realms/master) — I did not disturb it.

The collision is unique to keycloak: it is the ONLY recipe that is both a live-warm provider (in
WARM_DOMAINS) AND would want a canonical. No collision-free canonical namespace exists today.

Classification: **HARNESS defect — warm canonical domain namespace can collide with a live-warm
provider.** NOT a recipe/flake. Fix approach (M2): make `canonical_domain(r)` collision-free when `r`
is a live-warm provider — e.g. `warm-canon-<r>` (or unconditionally) so the canonical deploy gets a
distinct domain → distinct stack → cannot touch the live `warm-keycloak`. Then set keycloak
WARM_CANONICAL=True and verify it promotes at the collision-free domain WITHOUT disrupting live
keycloak. Minimal blast radius: special-case only providers in WARM_DOMAINS (the 15 other canonicals
keep `warm-<r>`); confirm in M2.

## 2026-06-18T01:05Z — M1: gitea first advance attempt hit a LEFTOVER confound (not the real crash)

First gitea cold@3.6.0 run: cold lifecycle (install/upgrade/backup/restore/custom) ALL PASS; promote
advance FAILED with `FATA warm-gitea.ci.commoninternet.net is already deployed` — NOT the app.ini
crash. Cause: warm-gitea was left DEPLOYED at 3.5.3 by the nixenv-phase sweep (registry said
status=idle but the stack was actually running — a state inconsistency). The advance does `abra app
deploy warm-gitea` assuming the canonical is idle/undeployed; finding it deployed, abra FATAs. This is
the same GREEN-BUT-PROMOTE-FAILED the nixenv phase saw. To reproduce the REAL app.ini issue I undeployed
warm-gitea (docker stack rm; retained data+config volumes → proper idle state) and re-ran gitea
cold@3.6.0 (gitea2). Result pending. NOTE: the "already deployed" promote-failure-when-left-deployed
may be a secondary promote-machinery robustness gap (advance should undeploy-or-chaos an
already-deployed canonical) — will assess after confirming the primary app.ini crash.

## 2026-06-18T00:14Z — M1: gitea warm advance — app.ini read-only JWT crash CONFIRMED (recipe defect)

After restoring warm-gitea to proper idle state (undeployed, 3.5.3 data+config volumes retained),
re-ran gitea cold@3.6.0 (gitea2, log /tmp/redfix-gitea2.log). Cold lifecycle ALL PASS
(install/upgrade/backup/restore/custom — incl. the cold FRESH 3.5.3→3.6.0 upgrade tier). WC5 promote
advance then crash-loops. Live container logs (warm-gitea_..._app, repeated Failed/exit 1):

  modules/setting/setting.go:105:LoadCommonSettings() [F] Unable to load settings from config:
  error saving JWT Secret for custom config: failed to save "/etc/gitea/app.ini":
  open /etc/gitea/app.ini: read-only file system

EXACTLY the canon-documented crash. Mechanism: the recipe mounts app.ini as a docker `config`
(read-only by design) at /etc/gitea/app.ini (compose `configs: - source: app_ini target:
/etc/gitea/app.ini`, app.ini.tmpl). gitea 1.24.2 (3.6.0), on the warm REATTACH of the retained
3.5.3 config volume, decides to (re)generate+SAVE a JWT secret to app.ini → read-only fs → FATA at
config-load, BEFORE any DB migration (so the 3.5.3 data volume stays intact — confirmed canon).

Why cold passes but warm crashes: the cold fresh deploy + cold chaos-upgrade use freshly-generated
secrets consistent with a freshly-initialized config, so gitea never needs to rewrite app.ini. The
warm advance reattaches an OLDER retained config-volume state (seeded under 3.5.3) against the new
run's secrets/3.6.0 binary → gitea reconciles by trying to persist a JWT secret → read-only crash.

Classification: **genuine RECIPE defect** (gitea 3.6.0/1.24.2 + read-only app.ini docker-config mount
on the warm-reattach advance), deterministic, reproduced first-hand. NOT a flake, NOT promote
machinery. Fix approach (M2): recipe PR making app.ini writable on the advance path — e.g. render the
config into the WRITABLE `config:/etc/gitea` volume via an entrypoint (not a read-only docker config),
OR ensure the persisted secrets are accepted without rewrite. (Secondary harness option: canonical
advance falls back to clean re-deploy when in-place config rewrite is impossible — but that loses the
reattach data-warm property; recipe fix preferred.) Ties to LFS PR #1 (app.ini secret handling).

ACTION NEEDED after run exits: warm-gitea is left crash-looping at 3.6.0 → restore it to 3.5.3
(redeploy the known-good canonical version) so the canonical is healthy again. Data volume intact.

## 2026-06-18T00:25Z — M1 CLAIMED (6/6 investigated, isolated, classified)

mumble repeat #2 (mumble2): ALL tiers green again incl. handshake; canonical re-promoted green
(ts 20260618T001730Z). So mumble = 2× reproducibly green in isolation → load/timing FLAKE confirmed.

All six classified with first-hand isolation evidence (or code proof for keycloak). Two canon
root-causes were CORRECTED by isolation: discourse (not a timeout/deploy-FATA — it's a stale cc-ci
overlay test asserting an unreleased migration) and mattermost-lts (not a loaded-node race — a
deterministic recipe restore defect: missing `backupbot.restore.post-hook`). bluesky's 000 is NOT a
load/rate-limit flake (my initial hypothesis) but a deterministic caddy↔app `app`-alias DNS collision
on the shared proxy. gitea app.ini read-only JWT crash reproduced first-hand. keycloak collision proven
structurally in code.

Node clean: warm-gitea idle@3.5.3 (volumes retained), orphaned warm-bluesky removed, only live
warm-keycloak up (healthy 200). Claiming M1; will start M2 fix design while awaiting the Adversary
verdict (keep an unblocked item in hand).

## 2026-06-18T00:25Z — M2 prep (gated on M1 PASS): bluesky fix refinement

While parked at the M1 gate (no node deploys — Adversary cold-verifying), refined the bluesky fix:
cc-ci's bluesky tests probe via HTTP (/xrpc/_health), but the GENERIC harness defaults to
`service="app"` (deployed_identity/_app_container). So RENAMING the recipe's `app` service → `pds`
could break generic harness assumptions. Cleaner fix: keep the service named `app` but give it a
UNIQUE network ALIAS on the internal net (e.g. `aliases: [pds-internal]`) and point caddy at
`pds-internal:3000` (reverse_proxy + on_demand_tls ask). A unique alias has no collision on the shared
proxy (only the bare `app` alias collides), and the service name stays `app` → zero cc-ci-side
breakage. Will validate this exact approach in M2 after M1 PASS.

## 2026-06-18T01:21Z — M1 PASS; starting M2

Adversary M1 verdict: **PASS** @01:18Z — all 6 classifications cold-verified CORRECT by its OWN
isolation re-runs (discourse/mattermost/mumble/bluesky/gitea) + code-verify (keycloak). No VETO.
"Builder cleared to proceed to M2." Two canon root-causes corrected and confirmed (discourse: not a
timeout, stale overlay; mattermost: not a load race, recipe defect). bluesky reclassification (recipe,
not warm-machinery) confirmed against the plan's prior.

Starting M2. Plan: recipe PRs (mattermost-lts, bluesky-pds, gitea) via the recipe mirror+PR flow
(`!testme`-verified, never merge); harness fixes (keycloak collision-free canonical_domain + enroll;
mumble handshake stabilization) on a cc-ci branch; discourse overlay-scope decision. Node now mine
(Adversary done). Will examine the recipe-create-pr flow first, then execute one fix at a time.

## 2026-06-18T01:25Z — M2 recon: prior-phase fix PRs already exist for discourse + mattermost

Surveyed open PRs on all 6 mirrors before doing redundant work:
- **discourse #4** `discourse-official-image` ("switch to official discourse/discourse"): created
  2026-06-16 by autonomic-bot; **!testme PASSED twice**, latest @53ba0910 today 16:36Z (run #849) ✅.
  This migrates off deprecated bitnamilegacy → official image + drops sidekiq = EXACTLY what the
  upgrade overlay asserts. So the overlay test was correctly demanding the migration; PR #4 IS the
  discourse fix and is already !testme-green. (Reframes M1 "stale test": the test is right; the
  release tag predates the migration; the fix is the migration PR, not weakening the test.)
- **mattermost-lts #1** `ci/pg-restore` ("reimport the postgres dump on restore"): correct
  immich-pattern fix — pg_backup.sh (backup pg_dump|gzip; restore: terminate conns + DROP DATABASE
  WITH FORCE + createdb + reimport) + dump-only `backup.volumes.postgres_data.path: backup.sql` +
  `restore.post-hook: /pg_backup.sh restore`. Created 2026-05-30; needs a fresh !testme to confirm
  green NOW. (Also PR #2 upgrade-2.1.11 overlaps — adds restore hook + version bump; #1 is the focused
  fix.)
- mumble #1 = "cfold sweep probe" (not the fix — mumble is a harness flake, no recipe PR needed).
- bluesky #3 = version bump (not the routing fix — need a NEW PR for the app-alias collision).
- gitea, keycloak = no open PRs (gitea LFS #1 closed; keycloak is a harness fix).

M2 plan refined: VERIFY discourse #4 (re-!testme fresh) + mattermost #1 (!testme); CREATE recipe PRs
for bluesky (unique alias) + gitea (app.ini writable); HARNESS fixes for mumble (handshake stab) +
keycloak (collision-free canonical_domain + enroll). Starting with mattermost #1 !testme.

## 2026-06-18T01:30Z — M2: mattermost-lts FIXED (verified) + discourse already green + bluesky PR created

- **mattermost-lts**: !testme on PR #1 `ci/pg-restore` (@4ca7f418) → run #901 ALL tiers green
  (install/upgrade/backup/restore/custom, every junit failures=0 skipped=0). The M1-failing
  `restore__cc-ci__test_restore.py::test_restore_returns_state` now PASSES — the pg_backup.sh restore
  post-hook (terminate conns + DROP DATABASE WITH FORCE + createdb + reimport dump) round-trips
  postgres state. **FIXED + verified.** (Nothing merged — operator merges.)
- **discourse**: PR #4 `discourse-official-image` already !testme-green @53ba0910 (run #849, today
  16:36Z) — the official-image migration makes the upgrade overlay pass. Will re-verify fresh for
  current evidence before the M2 claim.
- **bluesky-pds**: created mirror PR #4 `ci/warm-routing-alias` (unique `pds` alias on internal +
  caddy reverse_proxy/ask → pds:3000; service stays `app`). compose validated (`docker compose config`
  rc=0). VERIFICATION NOTE: bluesky's 000 is warm-promote-only (cold path always green), so !testme
  (cold) won't reproduce/verify it — I'll verify by running the FIXED recipe through the promote path
  (cold-on-latest with the fix checked out) → warm-bluesky-pds should serve 200 (vs M1's 000), then
  tear down the phantom canonical.

Remaining M2: bluesky promote-verify, gitea recipe PR (app.ini writable), keycloak harness
(collision-free canonical_domain + enroll), mumble harness (handshake stabilization).

## 2026-06-18T02:10Z — M2 bluesky: alias fix blocked by abra; pivoting to service RENAME

Verified the bluesky `pds` network-alias fix end-to-end and found a blocker:
- `docker stack deploy` HONORS compose network aliases (throwaway test: app got `Aliases:["pds","app"]`).
- `docker compose config` PRESERVES the alias in its render.
- BUT the harness/abra promote deploy produced an app service with `Aliases:["app"]` only — the `pds`
  alias was DROPPED. The fixed Caddyfile (pds:3000) DID deploy (same per-run tree), so abra read my
  recipe tree; by elimination, **abra's own compose→swarm translation drops service network aliases**
  (it's not docker, not the tree). Also confirmed: the bluesky promote is a non-chaos pinned deploy.
  (Two stale-config gotchas also hit + fixed: docker configs are immutable+versioned — a stale
  `warm-bluesky..._caddyfile_v1` was reused until I removed it; lesson for gitea = bump config versions.)

→ Pivot to the ROBUST fix: RENAME the PDS service `app`→`pds`. Docker auto-adds the service short-name
as a network alias (abra can't drop that — the deployed `app` proved the service-name alias is always
applied), so caddy's `reverse_proxy pds:3000` resolves THIS stack's PDS (unique on internal; no `pds`
on the shared proxy). Coupled cc-ci change: 2 `exec_in_app(...)` calls default `service="app"`
(`tests/bluesky-pds/_p4.py:40`, `custom/test_account_and_post.py:49`) → must become `service="pds"`
(NOT a weakening — same assertion, correct service). The warm-routing PROOF (warm-bluesky-pds→200) is
the promote path (custom exec tests not involved); cold !testme-green needs the cc-ci ref update.

Need to determine how cc-ci-side code reaches a !testme run (also required for keycloak + mumble
harness fixes) — investigating CCCI_REPO/Drone checkout next.

## 2026-06-18T02:15Z — cc-ci-side change verification mechanism (for bluesky-rename/keycloak/mumble)

The Drone !testme build clones cc-ci at main HEAD; the manual runner runs from CCCI_REPO (default
/etc/cc-ci). To verify a cc-ci-side change WITHOUT pushing main or disturbing /etc/cc-ci (shared with
Adversary): push the change to a cc-ci BRANCH, clone/checkout that branch to a temp dir on cc-ci, and
run `cd <tmp> && CCCI_REPO=<tmp> cc-ci-run runner/run_recipe_ci.py RECIPE=... CCCI_SKIP_FETCH=1`
(cc-ci-run is the deployed nix env; runner/ + tests/ come from my branch checkout). Restores cleanly.

bluesky-rename coupling: the warm-promote only fires on a FULLY-GREEN cold run, and bluesky's custom
tier exec_in_app defaults to service="app". So renaming app→pds REQUIRES the cc-ci exec-ref update
(service="pds") deployed via the temp-checkout for the cold run to go green and the promote to fire.
So: (1) recipe rename PR, (2) cc-ci branch with exec-ref update, (3) verify via temp-checkout run ->
cold green -> promote -> warm-bluesky-pds 200.

## M2 progress snapshot (2026-06-18T02:15Z)
- mattermost-lts: DONE (PR #1 ci/pg-restore, !testme run #901 all-green incl restore). 
- discourse: DONE (PR #4 discourse-official-image, !testme run #849 green; re-verify fresh for claim).
- bluesky-pds: PR #4 (alias) -> superseding with service RENAME app->pds + cc-ci exec-ref update; verify on promote path.
- gitea: fix READY locally (/tmp/redfix-gitea: app.ini->staging + docker-setup seed-once + DOCKER_SETUP_SH_VERSION v2); needs PR push + warm-advance verify.
- keycloak: harness fix (canonical_domain collision-free for WARM_DOMAINS recipes + enroll) NOT STARTED.
- mumble: harness fix (handshake readiness/retry stabilization) NOT STARTED.

## 2026-06-18T02:45Z — M2 progress: gitea PR + harness branch pushed; bluesky pivoted to rename

- **gitea**: opened recipe PR #2 `ci/app-ini-writable` (app.ini->staging + docker-setup seed-once +
  DOCKER_SETUP_SH_VERSION v2). Advance-path verification RUNNING (fixed 3.6.0 reattach to idle 3.5.3
  canonical; expect no app.ini crash + promote). cold lifecycle green so far (install + cold upgrade
  converged).
- **bluesky**: PR #4 updated alias->RENAME service app->pds (abra drops aliases). 3-line recipe diff,
  validates. Coupled cc-ci exec-ref change on branch.
- **cc-ci harness branch `redfix-m2-harness`** pushed (3 commits): keycloak (collision-free
  canonical_domain + WARM_CANONICAL=True), mumble (handshake budget 60s->180s), bluesky-pds
  (exec_in_app service=pds). Verified via temp-checkout runs (CCCI_REPO=<branch checkout>).
- Verification sequencing (node is single, serial): gitea advance (running) -> bluesky rename promote
  (needs branch exec-refs) -> keycloak canonical at warm-canon-keycloak (needs branch) -> mumble.
  NOTE: mumble "green under load" is hard to reproduce deterministically; plan = show branch run still
  green + reason about the budget (or construct concurrent load).

## 2026-06-18T03:00Z — M2 gitea fix v1 (seed) BROKE the transition — needs rework

gitea advance verification (fixed 3.6.0): install tier PASSED FULLY (fresh 3.6.0 + my fix: API 200,
admin auth OK — so the seed works for a FRESH deploy), but upgrade/backup/restore/custom ALL FAILED:
`READY_PROBE not ready: /api/v1/version (last status 404) within 600s` after the 3.5.3->3.6.0 chaos
redeploy → gitea came up in INSTALL-WIZARD mode (serves 200 but no API/admin = no valid app.ini).
The LFS custom test's repo-create also 404'd (same wizard-mode cause).

So my seed-once fix is fine for fresh install but FAILS the 3.5.3->3.6.0 transition — exactly the path
the canon fix needs. Likely cause: on the chaos redeploy from a 3.5.3 stack (docker_setup_sh_v1, no
seed) the docker-setup config didn't update to my v2 (seed) while compose moved app.ini to the staging
path → /etc/gitea/app.ini empty → wizard. (To confirm: reproduce + inspect the post-redeploy container
— is docker_setup_sh_v2 mounted? does /etc/gitea/app.ini exist? gitea log.) Reverted the fix from
cc-ci's gitea clone; warm-gitea intact (idle 3.5.3, promote didn't fire on the red cold run). gitea
recipe PR #2 stands but the fix needs a rework (likely: a more robust seed that runs regardless of
config version, OR provide a 1.24-valid oauth2 JWT secret so gitea never rewrites app.ini — investigate
WHY 1.24 regenerates it). Deferring gitea; proceeding to bluesky-rename / keycloak / mumble verifies.

## 2026-06-18T03:30Z — M2 bluesky verification BLOCKED by abra non-chaos tag-revert; keycloak/mumble next

Root cause of the bluesky rename verify failure: the deployed service was `..._app` (not `pds`).
`run_recipe_ci` CCCI_SKIP_FETCH copies my renamed clone to the per-run tree, BUT abra's NON-CHAOS
pinned deploy (bluesky's tag 0.3.0+v0.4.219 is ANNOTATED) does `git checkout <tag>` in the per-run
tree, REVERTING my rename to the tag's `app:`. So the renamed recipe never deployed; the branch
harness then execs `service=pds` -> "no running container <stack>_pds" -> backup/restore/custom red.
(This also re-explains the earlier "abra dropped the alias" — it was the same tag-revert, not a drop.)
gitea's tag is lightweight -> deploy_app uses chaos -> my gitea fix DID deploy (install passed); its
failure is a real transition issue, not a revert.

IMPLICATION: verifying a RECIPE fix (bluesky, gitea) via CCCI_SKIP_FETCH needs a CHAOS deploy (uses the
checkout, not the tag). HARNESS fixes (keycloak canonical_domain, mumble retry) are runner/test code
from the branch checkout — NO tag-revert — so they verify cleanly. Doing keycloak + mumble next.
For bluesky: force chaos (deploy_app does chaos when has_ccci_overlay) OR reconsider a cc-ci-side
overlay fix (alias + caddyfile override) — both verifiable; recipe PR #4 (rename) stays as the ideal
upstream fix. gitea: rework + reproduce-with-inspection.

## 2026-06-18T03:40Z — M2 keycloak FIXED + VERIFIED (collision-free canonical)

Ran keycloak cold-on-latest from branch checkout /tmp/cc-ci-m2run (harness fix: canonical_domain ->
warm-canon-keycloak for WARM_DOMAINS recipes; WARM_CANONICAL=True). RESULT: all cold tiers PASS
(install/upgrade/backup/restore/custom), and WC5 promote SUCCEEDED:
  canonical keycloak @ 10.8.0+26.6.3, domain="warm-canon-keycloak.ci.commoninternet.net", idle, volume retained.
- Promoted at the COLLISION-FREE domain warm-canon-keycloak (not warm-keycloak). ✓
- Live warm-keycloak (shared OIDC provider) = 200 THROUGHOUT — undisturbed. ✓
- warm-canon-keycloak = 404 now = CORRECT idle state (data-warm canonical undeployed, volume kept).
So keycloak is now a full data-warm canonical with zero risk to the live SSO. **FIXED + verified.**
3/6 verified: mattermost-lts, discourse, keycloak. Doing mumble next (harness, tractable).