# JOURNAL — Phase 1c (Builder)

Append-only. Each entry: what I did + verifying command/output + next.

## 2026-05-27 — Phase 1c kickoff / orientation

**Context:** Phase 1 closed DONE (1c10fa5; all D1–D10 Adversary-PASS, no VETO; Adversary loop
terminated for Phase 1). Starting Phase 1c per `plan-phase1c-full-reproducibility.md`.

**Did:**
- Read the phase plan in full + plan.md §6.1/§7/§9. Verified access & surveyed current state.
- `ssh cc-ci 'hostname && nixos-version && systemctl is-system-running'`
  → `nixos` / `24.11.20250630.50ab793 (Vicuna)` / `running`. Healthy.
- Surveyed secrets layout:
  - `secrets/secrets.yaml` holds 6 infra secrets: test_secret, drone_rpc_secret,
    drone_gitea_client_secret, bridge_drone_token, bridge_gitea_token, bridge_webhook_hmac.
  - `.sops.yaml`: recipients = `&host` (ssh-to-age of cc-ci ed25519 host key) + `&master`
    (off-box recovery, private at `/srv/cc-ci/.sops/master-age.txt`, sandbox-only).
  - `modules/secrets.nix`: `defaultSopsFile = ../secrets/secrets.yaml`,
    `age.sshKeyPaths = ["/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key"]`.
  - Wildcard cert OUT-OF-BAND at `cc-ci:/var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain.pem,privkey.pem}`
    (fullchain 2909 B, privkey 227 B → privkey looks like an EC key). `modules/proxy.nix` reconcile
    reads it from there and inserts as traefik `ssl_cert`/`ssl_key` swarm secrets; treats a missing
    cert as FATAL (operator precondition).
  - `flake.nix`: nixpkgs pinned `50ab793`, sops-nix pinned; single local `nixosConfigurations.cc-ci`.
- Tooling note: sandbox host has NO sops/nix/age/ssh-to-age (`which` → only git). sops/age work
  must run on cc-ci (has nix + host age key) or via a sops binary fetched there with the master key.
- Bootstrapped Phase-1c state: STATUS-1c.md, BACKLOG-1c.md, JOURNAL-1c.md (this file). REVIEW-1c.md
  left for the Adversary (its file per §6.1). Appended Phase-1c decisions to DECISIONS.md.

**Decisions recorded (DECISIONS.md):** secrets linkage = **git submodule** (deviates from the
flake-input default — rationale: no private-repo fetch credential needed at nix-eval on every
rebuild, keeps `defaultSopsFile` a local path = minimal change + trivially byte-identical);
bootstrap key for throwaway = **recovery age key via `sops.age.keyFile`**.

**Next (W2):** create private `recipe-maintainers/cc-ci-secrets`; move secrets + wildcard cert into
sops there as a submodule of the base; wire secrets.nix (cert→`/var/lib/ci-certs/live` via `path=`);
prove byte-identical build + clean switch with TLS from the git cert. Then claim Gate W2.

## 2026-05-27 — W2 step 1: cc-ci-secrets repo created + populated (DONE)

**Did:**
- Created private `recipe-maintainers/cc-ci-secrets` via Gitea API (bot, org admin). HTTP 201, private=True.
- Confirmed cc-ci host SSH key → age identity == `&host` recipient `age1h90utd…`:
  `ssh cc-ci 'nix shell nixpkgs#ssh-to-age --command ssh-to-age -i /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub'`
  → exact match. So I can decrypt/re-encrypt on cc-ci with the host key (master stays sandbox-only).
- Built `secrets.yaml` on cc-ci (script with file redirections, no key material in argv):
  `sops -d` existing 6 secrets → append `wildcard_cert`/`wildcard_key` as YAML block scalars from
  `/var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain.pem,privkey.pem}` → `sops -e`. Verified round-trip:
  - recipients: 2 (host+master)
  - keys: test_secret, drone_rpc_secret, drone_gitea_client_secret, bridge_drone_token,
    bridge_gitea_token, bridge_webhook_hmac, wildcard_cert, wildcard_key
  - cert sha256 file==decrypt `c1d96d61…`; key sha256 file==decrypt `9ec25d00…`; test_secret decrypts OK
- Retrieved ciphertext (7219 B) to sandbox; created cc-ci-secrets repo (root `secrets.yaml`, own
  `.sops.yaml` w/ `path_regex: secrets\.yaml$`, README). Pushed to main (auth via per-command
  http.extraHeader; verified `.git/config` has NO creds). Remote lists .sops.yaml/README.md/secrets.yaml.
- Cleaned `/root/cc-ci-secrets.yaml` + build script off cc-ci.

**Layout decision:** cc-ci-secrets has `secrets.yaml` at ROOT → submodule mounts at base `secrets/`
→ base sees `secrets/secrets.yaml`, so `defaultSopsFile = ../secrets/secrets.yaml` is UNCHANGED.

**Next (W2 step 2):** in base repo — replace tracked `secrets/` with the submodule; add
`wildcard_cert`/`wildcard_key` sops secrets in secrets.nix (path= → /var/lib/ci-certs/live, + recovery
keyFile); adjust proxy.nix framing; switch cc-ci to new config via
`nixos-rebuild switch --flake 'git+file:///root/cc-ci?submodules=1#cc-ci'`; prove byte-identical +
TLS-from-git-cert; then claim Gate W2. (Riskier — touches live server config; fresh iteration.)

## 2026-05-27 — W2a DONE + verified live; Gate W2 CLAIMED

**Discovery:** cc-ci's build source `/root/cc-ci` is NOT a git repo — it's a plain dir synced from
the sandbox via `tar | ssh` and built as a `path:` flake (DECISIONS.md:126). So cc-ci's deploy needs
NO submodule fetch / `?submodules=1` (the rsync'd dir already contains `secrets/`). The git-clone
`--recursive` + `?submodules=1` path is only for the documented install / throwaway (W4).

**Did (W2a — secrets split + cert into git, deployed to live cc-ci):**
- secrets.nix: added `wildcard_cert`(0444)/`wildcard_key`(0400) sops secrets → `path=/var/lib/ci-certs/live/*`.
- proxy.nix: reframed cert as sops-from-git (not operator drop); kept FATAL guard as a decrypt-path check.
- Base repo: `git rm secrets/secrets.yaml`; `git submodule add cc-ci-secrets secrets` (gitlink 2312f1c,
  `.gitmodules` has NO creds). Pushed f79e542 (rebased over Adversary's c360520; resolved the
  tracked-file→submodule transition by removing the submodule wd before rebase, repopulating after).
- Synced to cc-ci via `tar | ssh` (excluded .git). `nixos-rebuild build` → exit 0, only **6 derivations
  built** (sops manifest gains cert/key + proxy unit error-msg edit) → toplevel
  `vh6vwxbl4qr9whzpwgjimhf9gn4329p8` (differs from pre-W2 `m1pdvbhl…` — EXPECTED: cert moved
  out-of-band-file → Nix-managed sops; that is C2's whole point, not drift).
- Backed up operator cert (`/root/ci-certs-operator-bak`), removed the regular files, `nixos-rebuild
  switch` (detached unit `ccci-w2-switch`, Result=success).

**Verified live:**
- sops cert decrypt: `/var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain,privkey}.pem` are now symlinks → `/run/secrets/
  wildcard_{cert,key}`; content sha256 == source: `c1d96d61…` / `9ec25d00…` (byte-identical to the
  original operator cert, now git-sourced).
- `systemctl is-system-running` → running, 0 failed. `deploy-proxy` active/success.
- **Byte-identical (zero drift):** `nixos-rebuild build` == `/run/current-system` == `vh6vwxbl…`.
- **Documented git-clone path also reproduces it:** fresh `git clone --recursive` into a temp git repo
  + `nixos-rebuild build --flake 'git+file:///tmp/ccci-git?submodules=1#cc-ci'` → **vh6vwxbl… (MATCH)**.
  Proves the install/throwaway path works and equals running.
- **Live TLS from git cert:** `https://ci.commoninternet.net` http=200 ssl_verify=0; random
  `probe-*.ci.commoninternet.net` handshake ssl_verify=0 (404 route, expected) via gateway→cc-ci;
  served leaf `CN=*.ci.commoninternet.net`, LE issuer, valid to Aug 24 2026.

**For the Adversary verifying Gate W2 cold:** must init the submodule (`git clone --recursive` OR
`git submodule update --init`, bot creds) then build with `?submodules=1`, else `secrets/` is empty.
Both path: and git+submodules builds yield the same toplevel `vh6vwxbl…` (content-addressed).

**Deferred to W3/W4 prep (NOT in W2):** the recovery-key `sops.age.keyFile` for the throwaway VM —
adding it changes the closure again, so I'll add + test it on the throwaway (safe) and re-establish
byte-identical there. cc-ci stays on its proven host-key decrypt path for now.

**Next:** Gate W2 CLAIMED → await Adversary PASS on byte-identical + cert-in-git/TLS. Meanwhile prep W1
(resize) / W3 (throwaway VM) — read the incus skill.

## 2026-05-27 — W3 recon (read-only; while parked at Gate W2)

Incus skill read. b1 = 100.117.251.31:8443, project terraform-ci, mTLS certs at
/srv/incus-terraform-nix-vm-creator/terraform-secrets/{terraform.crt,terraform.key}. **b1 reachable
via the EXISTING cc-ci proxy** (`curl --proxy socks5h://127.0.0.1:1055 --cert/--key -k …`) — no
separate tailscaled needed (skill's own 1055 proxy would collide; reuse cc-ci's).

terraform-ci instances + RAM:
- cc-nix-test  Running  6GB  VM   ← this IS the live cc-ci; W1 resizes 6→4 (stop→set→start, hotplug times out)
- lichen-staging Running 4GB container (leave alone)
- kube-base / kube-base-test  Stopped 4GB VMs
- release-runner Stopped 8GB VM
Running total now = 10GB. After W1 + throwaway(4GB): 4+4+4 = 12GB ≤ 16 physical (phase-plan ~12GB
doc-only guideline; terraform-ci has no enforced limits.memory). VM create = `projects/incus-base`
Terraform template (NixOS base image, cloud-init+tailscale+nix flakes), set instance_name + limits.memory=4GB.

## 2026-05-27 — W1 DONE: cc-nix-test resized 6→4 GB (verified)

Gate W2 PASSED (Adversary, cold) → proceeded. No active CI run (only 5 permanent stacks). Resized via
Incus API on b1 (mTLS certs through the existing 1055 proxy): PUT state stop (op Success, Stopped) →
PATCH `limits.memory=4GB` (http 200) → PUT state start (op Success, Running).
**Verified after reboot:**
- SSH back in ~30s; `systemctl is-system-running` → running after ~104s (swarm/reconcile converge), 0 failed units.
- `free -h` total 3.5Gi (≈4 GB, down from 6). All stacks 1/1 (traefik app+socket-proxy, drone, bridge, dashboard, backups).
- **Cert survived reboot via sops:** `/var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain,privkey}.pem` still symlinks →
  /run/secrets/* (sops re-decrypted on cold boot). current-system still `vh6vwxbl…`.
- TLS: `https://ci.commoninternet.net/` http=200 ssl_verify=0 (dashboard served from git cert).
Running RAM now: cc-nix-test 4 + lichen-staging 4 = 8 GB; throwaway 4 → 12 GB ≤ 16 physical (guideline OK).

**Next: W3** — create blank 4 GB NixOS VM in terraform-ci, provision ONLY the bootstrap (recovery) age key.

## 2026-05-27 — W3: throwaway VM created (booting) + W4 design notes

**W3:** Created `ccci-throwaway` in terraform-ci via the **Incus REST API** (curl through the 1055
proxy — terraform/nix absent on sandbox; replicated `projects/incus-base/main.tf`): image
`incus-base-vm` (fp 3a0c4160), 4 GB RAM / 2 cpu / **20 GB disk** (>10 GB default, to dodge cc-ci's old
ENOSPC), cloud-init writes /etc/nixos/{configuration,incus-base}.nix + setup.sh + /etc/ts-auth-key
(incus workspace reusable key) + /etc/ts-hostname=ccci-throwaway; runcmd setup.sh (nix-channel
nixos-24.11, `nixos-rebuild boot`, sysrq reboot → tailscale auto-joins). ssh_authorized_keys = vm_ssh_key
(I hold private) + mfowler + cc-ci-root key. CREATE+START ops Success, status Running; first boot ~4-6 min.
NOTE: cc-nix-test was terraform-created (`projects/cc-nix-test`); my W1 API resize drifts its tfstate
(reconcile or accept in W6 final-sizing).

**W4 design (analysis; implement next):**
- cc-ci's `hosts/cc-ci/configuration.nix` pins tailscale `--hostname=cc-nix-test` + reads /etc/ts-auth-key,
  and `secrets.nix` decrypts ONLY via `age.sshKeyPaths` (host SSH key). Consequences for the throwaway:
  1. **Decryption:** throwaway's host SSH key is NOT a sops recipient → cc-ci config as-is can't decrypt
     there. **W4 must add `sops.age.keyFile = "/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt"`** and provision the **recovery
     age key** there (the ONE out-of-band secret). Open Q: does a *missing* keyFile abort activation on
     cc-ci (where the file won't exist)? If yes, also provision cc-ci's own host-derived age key at that
     path (no new exposure) OR keep sshKeyPaths+keyFile and confirm sops-nix tolerates the absence.
     Test path: add keyFile, deploy to cc-ci (rollback-safe via generations), observe.
  2. **Tailnet hostname:** after rebuild the throwaway re-ups as `cc-nix-test` → tailscale auto-suffixes
     the duplicate; the REAL cc-ci is accessed by IP (100.90.116.4) so it's unaffected. Verify the
     throwaway via its own IP (Incus state tailscale0 addr) and/or incus-agent `exec` (hostname-independent).
  3. **Bridge side effect:** throwaway's bridge would poll Gitea with the real token (fresh state ⇒ could
     re-trigger already-`!testme`'d PRs). Mitigate: run W4 when no `!testme` is pending; destroy promptly.
- Adding keyFile changes the closure again (W2 byte-identical was at `vh6vwxbl`); re-verify after.

## 2026-05-27 — W3 DONE (VM reachable) + keyFile finding

**W3 reachable:** throwaway base boot initially failed tailscale auth — the incus-workspace
`.test.env` key is **stale** ("invalid key: API key does not exist"). Fixed by writing the **current
`TS_AUTH_KEY` from /srv/cc-ci/.testenv** (same tailnet `taila4a0bf.ts.net`) to /etc/ts-auth-key and
`tailscale up`. VM now at **100.126.124.86**; `ssh -i vm_ssh_key` via the 1055 proxy works → NixOS
24.11 (rev 50ab793, == cc-ci), nix 2.24 flakes, 4 GB / 20 GB (13 G free). *(install.md/Adversary note:
provision the live TS key, not the stale workspace one.)*

**keyFile finding (decisive):** read sops-install-secrets main.go (sops-nix 77c423a, store
`hm2xjph…-source/pkgs/sops-install-secrets/main.go`): when `age.keyFile` is set, line ~1349
`os.ReadFile(AgeKeyFile)` and **returns a fatal error if the file is missing** → activation fails.
⇒ Adding `keyFile` to cc-ci's config FORCES the file to exist on cc-ci. Also: `sshKeyPaths` reads
`/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key` (exists on any host; non-recipient keys are simply unused), so keeping
both is safe on both hosts.

**W4 design (locked):** secrets.nix gets `sops.age.keyFile = "/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt"` (keep
sshKeyPaths). Provision that file = the host's bootstrap age key: on **cc-ci** = its host-derived age
key (ssh-to-age of the host SSH key — no new secret exposure); on the **throwaway** = the **recovery
key** (/srv/cc-ci/.sops/master-age.txt). cc-ci must get the file BEFORE the keyFile config deploys.
Adding keyFile changes the closure (supersedes W2 `vh6vwxbl`) → re-verify byte-identical after.

## 2026-05-27 — Orchestrator guidance for C4 TLS verification (W4 Step B)

The throwaway has a NEW tailscale IP (100.126.124.86); the canonical `ci.commoninternet.net`
gateway/DNS still points at the LIVE cc-ci, and the git cert is `*.ci.commoninternet.net`. So verify
C4 TLS **locally ON the throwaway**, WITHOUT repointing the live gateway and WITHOUT changing the
throwaway DOMAIN (keep DOMAIN=ci.commoninternet.net so the cert matches):
- ssh into the throwaway; `curl --resolve probe.ci.commoninternet.net:443:127.0.0.1 \
  https://probe.ci.commoninternet.net/` → hits the local traefik with SNI ci.commoninternet.net.
- Confirm the served leaf == the git cert (sha256 fullchain `c1d96d61…`; Adversary's leaf fingerprint
  `57:8D:67:9E:FE:89:…:B8:A6`). That proves the rebuilt system serves the git-sourced cert reproducibly.
- Do NOT use ci2 for the TLS test (no `*.ci2` cert → would mismatch). Operator wired
  `ci2.commoninternet.net` + `*.ci2` → 100.126.124.86 for *plain* reachability only (not needed for TLS).
- DNS/gateway/cert are documented external INSTANCE preconditions; C4 proves the VM rebuilds from git
  + the single bootstrap age key. Don't skip/fake the TLS check.

## 2026-05-27 — W4 Step A DONE + Step B launched (throwaway rebuild in flight)

**Step A (cc-ci → final keyFile config):** provisioned cc-ci `/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt` = host-derived
age key (pub == `age1h90utd…` == &host recipient, verified via age-keygen -y). Added
`sops.age.keyFile` to secrets.nix (9cc6788), synced, `nixos-rebuild build`→`izsmiajw…` (only
manifest+system rebuilt), switched (unit ccci-w4a-switch success). Verified: system running 0 failed,
**byte-identical build==running==`izsmiajw…` (ZERO DRIFT)**, cert still sha256 `c1d96d61…`. So cc-ci
activates cleanly with keyFile. NOTE: toplevel evolved `vh6vwxbl` (W2) → **`izsmiajw`** (final, +keyFile);
the published repo now builds to izsmiajw==running — this is the form the Adversary re-verifies for C4/DONE.

**Step B (throwaway live rebuild — IN FLIGHT):**
- Provisioned throwaway `/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt` = **recovery key** (via stdin; pub == `age1cmk26…`
  == &master recipient, verified) — the ONE out-of-band secret.
- `git clone --recursive` base (bot creds via http.extraHeader, the "given the repos" provisioning) →
  /root/cc-ci, submodule `secrets`→2312f1c, secrets.yaml ENC. Confirmed clone has `age.keyFile` line.
- Launched `nixos-rebuild switch --flake 'git+file:///root/cc-ci?submodules=1#cc-ci'` as detached unit
  `ccci-rebuild` (survives the tailscale re-up when cc-ci config activates). Monitoring via incus-agent
  `exec` (vsock — survives network restart). Expect 10-30 min (builds sops-install-secrets/abra/etc).

C4/W5 standard (Adversary dd710a6 == orchestrator guidance): keep DOMAIN=ci.commoninternet.net, verify
TLS locally on the VM via `curl --resolve …:443:127.0.0.1` (SNI ci.commoninternet.net), served leaf
fingerprint must == git cert leaf `57:8D:67:9E:…:B8:A6`; oneshots converge; only age key out-of-band.

## 2026-05-27 — W4 Step B: throwaway rebuilt; concurrent-abra race found + fixed

**Throwaway rebuild result (pre-fix config, clone @dd710a6):** `nixos-rebuild switch` BUILD succeeded
(2.8 G peak RAM < 4 GB, 11.5 min CPU) → toplevel **`izsmiajw…` == cc-ci's running system** (blank VM
reproduces cc-ci byte-for-byte from git + the bootstrap age key). **sops cert decrypted via the
RECOVERY key**: /var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain,privkey}.pem → /run/secrets/*, sha256 `c1d96d61…`
(match). swarm-init + docker active (node Ready/Leader). BUT activation reported "error(s) while
switching": `deploy-proxy` + `deploy-drone` FAILED → system `degraded`.

**Root cause:** the abra reconcilers (proxy/drone/bridge/dashboard/backupbot) are all
`wantedBy multi-user.target`; drone/bridge/dashboard were `after deploy-proxy` but **concurrent with
each other**, and backupbot concurrent with proxy. On a FRESH `~/.abra` they race on catalogue/recipe
init → fast failures. Confirmed: `abra recipe fetch traefik` works fine alone (rc=0); re-running the
oneshots **sequentially** (`systemctl restart deploy-proxy; …drone; …bridge; …dashboard; …backupbot`)
→ ALL success, system `running`, **0 failed, all 6 stacks 1/1** (traefik app+socket-proxy, drone,
bridge, dashboard, backups) — identical to cc-ci.

**Fix (7563d47):** serialize the chain via ordering-only `after`:
proxy → drone → bridge → dashboard → backupbot (bridge after drone, dashboard after bridge, backupbot
after dashboard). So a single `nixos-rebuild switch` on a blank host converges with no concurrent abra.
New toplevel `ld19aj2…`. Deploying to cc-ci (reconcilers already deployed there ⇒ serial no-op
re-runs) + re-verify byte-identical, then **recreate the throwaway FRESH** to prove single-switch
convergence (authoritative C4; mirrors the Adversary's W5 cold test).

This is the LAST planned config change before W4 completes (config stable ld19aj2 thereafter).

## 2026-05-27 — W4: cc-ci on serialized config (ld19aj2) + throwaway TLS leaf-match PASS

- cc-ci switched to serialized config: `systemctl is-system-running`=running, **byte-identical
  build==running==`ld19aj2dcrjm6jarq1k6rvhc0zww34qq` (ZERO DRIFT)**, 6 stacks.
- **Throwaway local TLS (C4 cert proof):** on the rebuilt throwaway (IP 100.126.124.86),
  `curl --resolve probe.ci.commoninternet.net:443:127.0.0.1` → http=404 (no route, expected)
  **ssl_verify=0**. Served leaf sha256 fingerprint == git-cert leaf:
  `57:8D:67:9E:FE:89:D5:FB:43:2E:2A:02:D6:A6:BA:F4:9B:98:1A:78:4A:6C:6A:85:DB:F6:A2:81:61:A6:B8:A6`
  (== Adversary reference). Full chain of custody: git sops → recovery-key decrypt → /var/lib/ci-certs/
  live → traefik swarm secret → served leaf. The rebuilt host serves the git-sourced cert.

Next: recreate throwaway FRESH with fixed config to prove SINGLE nixos-rebuild switch converges (0 failed).