# BACKLOG — phase `redfix` ## Build backlog ### M1 — investigate + isolate + classify (all six) - [ ] discourse — reproduce cold-deploy timeout/wedge in isolation; root-cause (headroom vs convergence bug vs upstream compose defect `sidekiq.depends_on: discourse`); classify. - [ ] mattermost-lts — `test_restore.py::test_restore_returns_state` in isolation: green→load flake, red→diagnose restore (recipe vs test). - [ ] mumble — `custom/test_protocol_handshake.py::test_handshake_completes_with_channel_presence` in isolation (canonical already present from today → likely flake; confirm). - [ ] bluesky-pds — warm-canonical promote routing: why `warm-bluesky-pds…` → 000 over HTTPS while container healthy internally + cold-test domain routes. Find cc-ci warm-machinery defect. - [ ] gitea — `3.5.3→3.6.0` warm advance crash (`app.ini` read-only, JWT save). Recipe vs harness. - [ ] keycloak — de-enrolled (live-warm OIDC collision). Design collision-free warm domain/namespace. ### M2 — FIX + verify all six (recipe PR or harness improvement) **Execution gated on M1 PASS** (avoid node contention with Adversary M1 re-runs; classifications must hold). Concrete fix designs from M1 evidence: - [ ] **mattermost-lts** (recipe PR, clearest) — add `pg_backup.sh` (immich pattern, no VectorChord bits): `backup(){ pg_dump -U mattermost mattermost | gzip > /var/lib/postgresql/data/backup.sql; }` `restore(){ gunzip -c …/backup.sql | psql -U mattermost -d mattermost -f -; }`. compose: add `configs: pg_backup → /pg_backup.sh`; postgres labels → `backup.pre-hook: /pg_backup.sh backup`, `restore.post-hook: /pg_backup.sh restore`, `backup.volumes.postgres.path: backup.sql` (dump-only, drop the whole-PGDATA `backup.path` + the `rm` post-hook). Verify via `!testme` → restore green. - [ ] **bluesky-pds** (recipe PR) — eliminate the `app`-alias collision on shared proxy: give the PDS service a unique name (e.g. `pds`) OR a unique network alias, and update caddy refs (`reverse_proxy`, `on_demand_tls ask http://…/tls-check`), healthcheck, backup labels, ops/test service= refs. Verify warm promote → 200 on /xrpc/_health. (NOTE: cc-ci harness `ops.py`/tests reference `service="app"` for bluesky? check + update if the recipe service renames — but recipe mirror is PR-only; cc-ci-side refs are a separate cc-ci change.) Confirm exact approach in M2. - [ ] **gitea** (recipe PR) — make app.ini writable on the warm-reattach advance so 3.6.0 can persist the JWT secret: render app.ini into the WRITABLE `config:/etc/gitea` volume via the existing `docker-setup.sh` entrypoint (copy the templated config to a writable path) instead of the read-only `app_ini` docker-config mount; OR ensure the persisted JWT secret is accepted without rewrite. Verify the 3.5.3→3.6.0 advance promotes. (Ties to LFS PR #1.) - [ ] **keycloak** (harness, cc-ci branch) — `canonical.canonical_domain(r)`: return a collision-free domain when `r` is a live-warm provider (`r in warm.WARM_DOMAINS`) → e.g. `warm-canon-.ci.commoninternet.net`; else keep `warm-` (zero blast radius on the 15 others). Set keycloak `WARM_CANONICAL=True`. Verify keycloak promotes at warm-canon-keycloak WITHOUT disrupting live warm-keycloak (200 throughout). - [ ] **mumble** (harness, cc-ci branch) — stabilize the handshake under load: add a READY_PROBE/ readiness gate (TCP 64738 stably listening + a successful handshake) before the custom tier and/or raise `retry_handshake` budget; verify green under a concurrent-load re-run. - [ ] **discourse** (TRICKIEST — decide in M2) — the overlay `test_upgrade.py` asserts a bitnamilegacy→official migration absent from all releases/main. Options: (a) cc-ci test PR (--with-tests) scoping the faithfulness assertion to ONLY fire when the head actually performs the migration (image still bitnamilegacy → N/A, not RED) — NOT a weakening, a correct scope; + file an upstream recipe issue/PR for the real bitnamilegacy→official migration. (b) recipe PR doing the migration (major rewrite — official discourse image is launcher-based, likely infeasible cleanly). Lean (a)+tracked-upstream; may need operator input (DEFERRED?) — assess in M2. ## Adversary findings (Adversary-owned — do not edit.)