# JOURNAL — Phase 1d (append-only) ## 2026-05-27 — Bootstrap Phase 1d Read SSOT `plan-phase1d-generic-test-suite.md` + plan.md §6.1/§7/§9. Studied the post-1b codebase: `runner/run_recipe_ci.py` (per-stage pytest, currently deploy-per-stage), `tests/conftest.py` (fixtures `deployed_app`/`deployed`/`old_app` each deploy+teardown), `runner/harness/{lifecycle,abra,naming}.py`, and existing recipe tests (custom-html/keycloak/etc.). Access re-verified (bootstrap, new phase): ``` $ ssh cc-ci 'hostname && whoami && nixos-version' nixos / root / 24.11.20250630.50ab793 (Vicuna) $ ssh cc-ci 'abra --version' -> abra version 0.13.0-beta-06a57de $ ssh cc-ci 'docker stack ls' -> traefik, drone, ccci-bridge, ccci-dashboard, backups all up $ ssh cc-ci 'grep -ri backupbot ~/.abra/recipes/custom-html/' compose.yml: backupbot.backup=true ; backupbot.backup.path=/usr/share/nginx/html $ curl -u bot ... /repos/recipe-maintainers/custom-html-tiny -> 200 (mirrored) ``` So: backup-capability is detectable by scanning compose for `backupbot.backup`; custom-html-tiny is mirrored and has NO cc-ci tests dir → it's the DG1 pure-generic target. **Design recorded in DECISIONS.md (Phase 1d section).** Key calls: tier model with the lifecycle OP owned by the shared harness (test files = assertions only); OVERRIDE precedence repo-local > cc-ci > generic with extend-by-composition; deploy-ONCE with a deploy-count guard; base version = previous (when upgrade runs) else target; backup-capability auto-detect; install-steps shell hook. Seeded STATUS-1d / BACKLOG-1d / JOURNAL-1d. Next: implement G0 (generic.py + discovery.py + tests/_generic/ + deploy-once orchestrator), then verify generic install green on custom-html-tiny. ## 2026-05-27 — G0 generic install + deploy-once orchestrator: DG1 GREEN Built the G0 machinery and proved DG1 end-to-end on the real server: - `runner/harness/generic.py` — `assert_serving` (services converged + real HTTP in HEALTH_OK [excludes 404] + not Traefik's 404 body + **CA-verified TLS cert is the trusted wildcard**), op helpers (`do_upgrade`/`do_backup`/`do_restore`), `backup_capable` (scan compose for backupbot.backup). - `runner/harness/discovery.py` — per-op overlay resolution (repo-local > cc-ci > generic), custom test discovery (both locations, additive), install-steps hook discovery. - `tests/_generic/test_{install,upgrade,backup,restore}.py` — assertion-only tiers using `live_app`. - `runner/run_recipe_ci.py` — deploy-ONCE orchestrator: base version (prev if upgrade+exists else target), tiers run against the shared deployment, one teardown in finally, deploy-count guard + per-op summary. - `tests/conftest.py` — `live_app` fixture (reads CCCI_APP_DOMAIN; tiers never deploy). - `lifecycle.deploy_app` — deploy-count recorder + install-steps hook + **pin DOMAIN to the run domain** (fixes recipes whose .env.sample uses `{{ .Domain }}`, which this abra leaves unexpanded). **Two real generic bugs found+fixed via live runs (not "should work"):** 1. custom-html-tiny deploy failed: `DOMAIN={{ .Domain }}` not auto-filled by `abra app new -D` on 0.13.0-beta → `can't evaluate field Domain`. Fix: `env_set(domain,"DOMAIN",domain)` in deploy_app. 2. `served_cert_subject` used `openssl s_client`, but **openssl is not on the host** (`cc-ci-run` runtimeInputs has no openssl) → it silently returned None → the "not default cert" check was a no-op (a DG7 can't-fail smell). Replaced with a pure-Python **CA-verified handshake** (`ssl`): a publicly-trusted LE wildcard verifies + matches hostname; Traefik's self-signed default fails verification → a genuine assertion. Verified the verify path on the host: `ssl.create_default_context()` against ci.commoninternet.net → VERIFIED, CN=*.ci.commoninternet.net, SAN=[*.ci.commoninternet.net, ci.commoninternet.net]. **DG1 evidence (cc-ci, final code):** custom-html-tiny is a static-web-server with an empty content volume → genuinely serves 404 zero-config (not a serving demo), so picked **hedgedoc** (simple category, NO cc-ci/repo-local tests → pure generic; backup-capable bonus): ``` $ RECIPE=hedgedoc STAGES=install cc-ci-run runner/run_recipe_ci.py ===== TIER: install (generic: tests/_generic/test_install.py) ===== tests/_generic/test_install.py::test_serving PASSED ===== RUN SUMMARY ===== deploy-count = 1 (expect 1) install : pass $ docker stack ls | grep hedg -> (none — clean teardown) ``` Lint+format clean (`ruff check`/`ruff format --check` via `nix develop .#lint`). Claiming the G0 gate. ## 2026-05-27 — G0/DG1 PASS; F1d-1 fixed; G1 backup+restore fixes **Adversary verdict: DG1 PASS @2026-05-27** (cold, own clone @ef44d46). G0 cleared. **Correcting an overstatement (Adversary finding F1d-1, valid):** my earlier G0 wording claimed the CA-verified cert check distinguishes "the app vs a Traefik default-cert fallback." It does NOT — Traefik's file provider serves the pre-issued **wildcard** for the WHOLE `*.ci.commoninternet.net` zone, so ANY in-zone subdomain (even a non-deployed one) verifies; the self-signed default cert is never served in-zone. The genuine app-vs-fallback proof is `services_converged` (the app's OWN service replicas N/N) + a non-404 status in HEALTH_OK (Traefik's unmatched-router fallback = 404). Fix applied (no code behavior change to the load-bearing checks; honesty/scope only): - `generic.served_cert` + `assert_serving` docstrings/comments reframed: the cert check is an INFRA TLS sanity check (catches a lapsed/mis-rotated wildcard cert — plan §4.0 renewal), explicitly NOT an app-vs-fallback check. Kept because it CAN fail (cert expiry/untrust), unlike the old openssl-missing no-op it replaced. - Assertion message reworded ("served wildcard cert is not trusted/valid", not "...not the default"). Noted for the Adversary to re-test + close F1d-1 (theirs to tick). **G1 — DG2 (upgrade) + DG3 (backup/restore) on hedgedoc (backup-capable, ≥2 tags 3.0.9→3.0.10):** Two real bugs found+fixed via live runs: 1. *backup artifact check.* `abra app backup snapshots` needs a TTY (`FATA the input device is not a TTY`), but `abra app backup create` already emits the restic JSON summary with the produced `"snapshot_id"` (rc 0, "backup finished"). Verified raw on a live custom-html: `snapshot_id": "d85bf492…"`. Fix: `backup_create` returns its output; `generic.parse_snapshot_id` regex-extracts the id; `do_backup` asserts it. (Dropped the TTY-bound `snapshots` listing.) 2. *restore serving race.* `assert_serving` made TWO requests (http_get then http_body); post-restore the app flapped between them → `http_body` raised an unhandled `HTTPError 404`. Fix: new `lifecycle.http_fetch` returns (status, body) in ONE request, never raising; `assert_serving` now BOUNDED-POLLS converged + serving (status+body from one request) so a post-op reconverge settles while a persistent failure still fails within HTTP_TIMEOUT (no bare sleep). `do_upgrade`/`do_restore` call it (dropped the redundant `wait_serving`). Re-running full hedgedoc install→upgrade→backup→restore to confirm all-green before claiming G1. ## 2026-05-27 — G1 GREEN (DG2 + DG3), claiming gate Full generic lifecycle on **hedgedoc** (no overlay → all tiers generic), final code, on cc-ci: ``` $ RECIPE=hedgedoc STAGES=install,upgrade,backup,restore CCCI_JANITOR_MAX_AGE=0 cc-ci-run runner/run_recipe_ci.py TIER: install (generic) test_serving PASSED # deploy base=prev 3.0.9, serves TIER: upgrade (generic) test_upgrade_reconverges PASSED # abra app upgrade -> 3.0.10 in place, reconverged+serving TIER: backup (generic) test_backup_artifact PASSED # snapshot_id produced TIER: restore (generic) test_restore_healthy PASSED # restored + healthy RUN SUMMARY: deploy-count = 1 (expect 1) install/upgrade/backup/restore : pass $ docker stack ls | grep -iE 'hedg|cust' -> (none — clean teardown) ``` - **DG2** (generic upgrade, prev→target in place on the shared deployment, reconverge+serving) ✅. - **DG3** backup-capable path ✅ (artifact = snapshot_id from create; restore completes + healthy). - **DG3 N/A logic** evidenced: `generic.backup_capable` → hedgedoc=True, custom-html=True, custom-html-tiny=False. The non-capable **run-demo** (backup/restore reported `skip`, install passing) lands naturally in **G3**: custom-html-tiny is non-backup-capable AND only serves once the install-steps content hook is added — so the same recipe proves DG5 (fail-without/pass-with) and DG3-N/A (skip on a serving non-backup recipe) together. - **DG4.1** corroborated again: deploy-count=1 across the whole install→upgrade→backup→restore run. Claiming G1. ## 2026-05-28 — F1d-2 fix: pinned base now deploys the pinned version (DG2 was vacuous) **Adversary G1 verdict: FAIL** — DG2 upgrade was a vacuous no-op. F1d-1 CLOSED (cert reframe accepted). Root cause (Adversary + my confirmation): `deploy_app` always deployed with `-C` (chaos = current checkout), which IGNORES the version pin → a "previous-version" base actually deployed LATEST, so "upgrade to newest" was latest→latest and only the still-serving assertion ran ⇒ a broken upgrade would pass. Real defect. **Fix (two parts):** 1. `deploy_app` now checks the recipe out to the pinned tag (`abra.recipe_checkout`) AND deploys **non-chaos** when a version is pinned (`abra.deploy(chaos=(version is None))`). Chaos stays only for the version=None case (deploy the current PR-head checkout). 2. Hardened the generic upgrade so a no-op CANNOT pass by construction: `do_upgrade` captures the app service's (coop-cloud version label, image) before+after and asserts the deployment actually MOVED (`lifecycle.deployed_identity`). Even if the pin regressed again, before==after → FAIL. **Probe (the Adversary's exact F1d-2 test, my code, on cc-ci) — now PASSES:** ``` prev: 3.0.9+1.10.7 IMAGE BEFORE (asked prev): quay.io/hedgedoc/hedgedoc:1.10.7@sha256:3174abea… ← was 1.10.8 (LATEST) pre-fix IMAGE AFTER (upgraded) : quay.io/hedgedoc/hedgedoc:1.10.8@sha256:423f4117… CHANGED: True ``` Re-running the full hedgedoc + custom-html lifecycles to confirm all-green with the move-assertion, then re-claim G1 (and G2: custom-html overlays override+extend the generic, deploy-count=1).