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cc-ci-orchestrator/.claude/skills/cve-check/SKILL.md
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autonomic-bot 74117c2260 cve-check: record the remedy for a blind recipe, not just the symptom
The skill said to render a sourceless recipe as '?'. It now says how to stop it
being sourceless: declare an NVD CPE in the registry. That is what took the fleet
from two blind recipes to zero, and it is the first thing to try when the sweep
flags another.
2026-08-11 22:16:52 +00:00

205 lines
13 KiB
Markdown

---
name: cve-check
description: Fleet-wide CVE sweep WITHOUT upgrading anything. For every recipe cc-ci deploys, works out what upgrade is available (current pinned tag → newest supported tag, per image including sidecars), runs the deterministic advisory scan over that window, adjudicates whatever the scan could not decide, and publishes a CVE report to report.ci.commoninternet.net as cve-<DATE>.html. READ-ONLY — opens no PRs, edits no recipes, runs no CI, merges nothing. Answers "what are we exposed to that an upgrade would fix?" in minutes rather than the hours a full upgrade run takes. Invoke as /cve-check [recipe ...] [--weekly-only].
---
# cve-check
A **security sweep, not an upgrade run.** It answers one question for every recipe cc-ci deploys:
> If we upgraded this recipe today, how many CVEs would that fix, and how bad are they?
It is the cheap, safe half of `/upgrade-all`: the same version research and the same advisory scan,
with **no implementation, no CI, and no PRs**. Use it when you want the security picture now — after a
vendor announcement, before deciding what to prioritise, or between weekly runs. When you want the PRs
too, use **`/cve-check-and-upgrade`**.
**Read-only, absolutely.** Never edit a recipe, never open or comment on a PR, never merge, never
deploy. The only thing it writes is its own log and the published report page.
## Arguments
- `<recipe> …` — sweep only these recipes (else every recipe in `cc-ci-plan/used-recipes.md`).
- `--weekly-only` — skip rows tagged `external`. **Off by default on purpose**: an `external` recipe is
still deployed and still exposes us, so a security sweep that silently skipped it would misreport the
fleet's exposure. Externals are swept and clearly marked "maintained elsewhere" in the report.
## Procedure
> ### ⚠️ Run abra over a pseudo-TTY (or it FATAs `inappropriate ioctl for device`)
> `abra` needs a TTY. Wrap every abra call: `ssh cc-ci 'script -qec "abra <args> -n" /dev/null'`.
> (`git` and other commands do NOT need the wrapper.)
### 1. Build the candidate list
Read `cc-ci-plan/used-recipes.md` — the canonical inventory. Take every row (both tiers), recording the
tier per recipe; with `--weekly-only`, drop the `external` rows. An explicit recipe argument overrides
any skip.
### 2. Per recipe — establish the upgrade window WITHOUT upgrading
This is `/recipe-upgrade` step 1's research, stopping before it implements anything.
> ⚠️ **The same four things that silently skip recipes apply here — handle ALL FOUR:**
> 1. **pseudo-TTY** — per the box above.
> 2. **go-git auth to git.autonomic.zone** — recipes on the private mirror FATA
> `authentication required: Unauthorized`. Bake creds into origin first (idempotent, only when
> origin is on git.autonomic.zone):
> `git -C ~/.abra/recipes/<r> remote set-url origin "https://$GITEA_USERNAME:$GITEA_PASSWORD@git.autonomic.zone/recipe-maintainers/<r>.git"`
> 3. **dirty worktree** — usually just the untracked cc-ci overlay; `git stash -u` before, `stash pop`
> after. Only a genuinely dirty TRACKED tree is a skip.
> 4. **tag+digest pins abra cannot parse** — abra FATAs and aborts the WHOLE recipe (immich). Do not
> hand-check the registry; run the resolver, which is abra-independent and covers every image:
> ```
> python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/resolve-images.py <recipe> --ssh cc-ci --table
> ```
> It reports, per image, `newest_within_major` (the compatibility-safe pick) and
> `newest_same_shape` (the newest of that tag's form). **Use `newest_within_major` unless you have
> checked the app supports the major jump** — immich's postgres tag encodes the pg major plus the
> vectorchord/pgvectors versions immich-server is built against, so taking the newest would break
> the deploy. `all_resolved: false` means an image could NOT be resolved — that is a `?`, never a 0.
**Reconcile the mirror from true upstream FIRST — ALWAYS, no exceptions** — one command,
`cc-ci-plan/reconcile-upstream.sh <recipe>... | --all`. This is the same reconcile
`/upgrade-all` does. Do not skip it in the name of keeping the sweep read-only: skipping it makes you
research a stale checkout, and on the first real run that produced **two recipes with no survey output
at all**, which is indistinguishable from "no upgrades" unless you check. It is safe — recipe work
lives in **branches**, never directly on `main`, so a force-sync of `main` to upstream discards
nothing; it also auto-closes mirror PRs whose changes upstream has already merged.
> ### ⚠️ The default branch may be `master`, not `main` — check, do not assume
> Several coopcloud recipes keep a **stale `main` alongside the real default `master`**. gitea is one:
> `main` sits at 1.24.2-rootless while `master` has 1.27.1-rootless plus the merged PRs and the 3.6.3
> release. Reading `main` there tells you the recipe is three releases behind and missing two CVSS-9.8
> RCE fixes — a false alarm that reads exactly like a real one. Resolve the default branch from the
> API (`/api/v1/repos/coop-cloud/<recipe>` → `default_branch`) before reading any file, and never
> `git reset --hard origin/main` on a checkout that tracks `master`.
**Cross-check abra with the resolver.** abra is the primary source, but it silently contributes
nothing for images it cannot parse, and it reported "no new versions" for images that did have them
(mumble v1.6.870-0 → -4). Run `resolve-images.py` for every recipe and take the UNION of the two: on
the first real sweep the resolver found upgrades abra missed entirely in five recipes, one of which
(plausible's clickhouse) carried four CVEs.
Then read versions:
```
set -a; . /srv/cc-ci/.testenv; set +a
ssh cc-ci "GITEA_USERNAME='$GITEA_USERNAME' GITEA_PASSWORD='$GITEA_PASSWORD' GITEA_URL='$GITEA_URL' bash -s <recipe> --reconcile-only" \
< /srv/cc-ci/.claude/skills/recipe-upgrade/open-recipe-pr.sh
ssh cc-ci 'export PATH=/run/current-system/sw/bin:$PATH; R=<recipe>; \
git -C ~/.abra/recipes/$R stash -u >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; \
script -qec "abra recipe fetch $R --force -n" /dev/null; \
script -qec "abra recipe upgrade $R -m -n" /dev/null; \
git -C ~/.abra/recipes/$R stash pop >/dev/null 2>&1 || true'
```
For each recipe produce **one window per image**: `current pinned tag → newest supported tag`. You need
the sidecars (redis, postgres, nginx …), not just the app — a sidecar bump is where discourse's only
CRITICAL came from, and an image with no window is not counted at all.
- **No upgrade available** → the recipe is `UPTODATE`; its CVE count is **`0`**, not `?`. There is
nothing an upgrade could fix. Record it and move on.
- **No output at all is NOT "no upgrade".** An abra call that times out, FATAs, or prints nothing
leaves the recipe **unverified** — treat it as a distinct outcome, never fold it into up-to-date.
Re-run it, and if it still yields nothing, resolve the versions by direct registry check (box item 4).
Only report `?` once BOTH the abra check and the direct check have failed. On the first real run this
distinction was the difference between two false zeros and the truth (both recipes turned out fine,
but nothing in the survey said so).
### 2c. Know which recipes CANNOT see CVEs at all
```
python3 cc-ci-plan/audit-sources.py --security-sources
```
A recipe whose sources yield **no CVE data at all** cannot produce a meaningful `0` — nothing was
measured, the same way a missing registry file cannot. Render those as **`?`**, not `0`.
**The fleet is currently at zero such recipes.** The last two — `mattermost-lts` (empty advisory
feed, client-side-rendered bulletins) and `mumble` (nothing published anywhere) — were fixed by
declaring an NVD CPE in their registry:
```
- nvd-cpe: mattermost-team-edition = cpe:2.3:a:mattermost:mattermost_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
```
**If this sweep ever reports a blind recipe again, that is the fix**: find the product's CPE at
nvd.nist.gov and add the line. Prefer a real advisory feed or an attributable changelog when one
exists — NVD lags the vendor — but a lagging source beats no source, and it turns a `?` into a
number.
An *unparseable page* is NOT the same thing: it is harmless when the same project also publishes an
advisory feed (redis, gitea, minio, clickhouse all do). Only "no usable source for this image" counts.
### 3. Run the advisory scan over that window
```
python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/advisory-scan.py <recipe> --from <old-app> --to <new-app> \
[--image <name>=<old>:<new>]...
```
**One call per recipe with every image in it** — the count is a union across images, and the
UNKNOWN guarantee only holds when a single run sees them all. Paste the markdown block verbatim into
the per-recipe log at `/srv/cc-ci/.cc-ci-logs/cve-check/<DATE>/<recipe>.md`.
### 4. Adjudicate what the scan could not decide (pass 2)
If the block reports advisories it **could NOT judge**, or the count is **UNKNOWN**, re-run with
`--adjudicate` and decide each open case yourself:
```
python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/advisory-scan.py <recipe> … --adjudicate
```
Answer **FIXED / NOT-FIXED / STILL-UNKNOWN** per case, each with a one-line reason **citing the
evidence shown** — never from memory of the project, which is the exact failure that let two CVSS-9.8
gitea RCEs be published as "none". Every FIXED is added to the count; pass 1's number is a floor. The
block also lists what pass 1 already decided — if a verdict looks wrong given its evidence, say so.
Record your verdicts in the per-recipe log so the number is auditable.
### 5. Classify severity and priority
For each recipe collect the CVE ids with **severities** (the scan gives them, with GHSA ids). Sort the
report rows by what an operator should deal with first:
1. recipes with a **critical**, then **high**, then anything else with CVEs (more CVEs higher within a band);
2. then `?` (a count that could not be established — investigate, do not ignore);
3. then recipes with an upgrade available but **0** CVEs;
4. then `UPTODATE`.
Severity outranks raw count: 2 CVSS-9.8 RCEs matter more than 120 medium plugin advisories.
### 6. Write the report spec
`/tmp/cve-spec-<DATE>.json`, same shape as `/recipe-report` (see `recipe-report.py`'s header), with:
- **`"kind": "cve"`** — titles the page "The Recipe Report — CVE check" and files it as
`cve-<DATE>.html`. It appears in the SAME archive index as the weekly editions, suffixed
"— CVE check" so the two are told apart at a glance. Without this field you would overwrite that
date's weekly edition.
- `date`, `subtitle` "CVE check <human date>",
- `lead` — **one short paragraph**: fleet exposure in a sentence and what to do first.
- `table[]` — every recipe swept. `recipe`; `change` = the window you scanned, e.g.
`1.27.0 → 1.27.1 · redis 7.4 → 8.10`; `status` = `UPTODATE` when nothing is available, else
`PENDING` (an upgrade exists and is not yet taken); **`cve`** = the count (integer, `?` only per the
rules below); `notes` = severity mix, whether the number is a floor, and `maintained elsewhere` for
`external` rows. **Leave `ci`/`pr` empty — nothing was built and no PR exists.**
- `addendum[]` — real anomalies only: registry URLs that failed, recipes whose window could not be
established, a scan whose count is a floor with many undetermined advisories.
- `security[]` — one entry per **critical/high** finding: recipe · CVE id(s) + severity · what it fixes
· **which image** it is in. Name the image: `CVE-2025-49844` is a redis flaw, and an operator reading
"discourse" needs to know that.
- `changes[]` — **omit** (nothing changed; there are no PRs).
**`?` must stay RARE.** Use it only when a scan ran and reported genuinely failed sources, or the count
came back UNKNOWN and adjudication could not settle it. Never `none` for an unknown — a blank reads as
clean. A recipe with no upgrade available is `0`, not `?`. Many `?` is a bug for the Addendum.
### 7. Render and publish — via the script only
```
python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/recipe-report.py render /tmp/cve-spec-<DATE>.json /tmp/cve-<DATE>.html
python3 /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-plan/recipe-report.py publish /tmp/cve-<DATE>.html <DATE> cve
```
All layout is owned by `recipe-report.py`. Never hand-write or post-process HTML; if `render` errors,
fix the spec JSON and re-render. **Public page — no secrets, tokens, internal hostnames, raw logs, or
any billing/spend figures.**
### 8. Verify and stop
`curl -fsS https://report.ci.commoninternet.net/cve-<DATE>.html` renders and the index lists it. Print
the URL, a one-line summary (`N recipes swept · M with CVEs · K critical`), and `CVE CHECK COMPLETE`,
then go idle. One-shot — do not loop, and do not start upgrading anything.
## Guardrails
- **Read-only.** No PRs, no edits, no merges, no deploys, no CI runs. If a recipe looks urgent, say so
in the report — do not act on it. `/cve-check-and-upgrade` is the skill that acts.
- **Never report `0` for something you could not scan.** `0` means checked-and-clean; unknown is `?`.
- A count with undetermined advisories is a **floor** — say so in the notes rather than rounding away.
- **Public-safe output only.**