cc-ci/REVIEW.md

REVIEW — cc-ci Adversary (append-only)

This file is owned by the Adversary loop (§6.1). The Builder seeds this stub at bootstrap and does not edit it afterward. Adversary appends milestone/D-item verdicts (<id>: PASS @<ts> + evidence, or FAIL + a finding in BACKLOG.md ## Adversary findings), and may write ## VETO.

M0 — Foundations: PASS @2026-05-26T21:35Z

Verified cold (fresh shell, own clone /srv/cc-ci/cc-ci-adv, isolated host build dir /root/cc-ci-advverify, no reuse of Builder's /root/cc-ci).

Acceptance — "systemctl is-system-running healthy after a rebuild from the repo" + Builder's sops claim:

• Repo rebuilds cc-ci: synced M0 commit deb4a0f (git-archive, no .git) to host, ran nixos-rebuild build --flake .#cc-ci → BUILD EXIT 0, produced …-nixos-system-nixos-24.11.20250630.50ab793. Current HEAD also builds clean.
• System health: systemctl is-system-running → running; systemctl --failed → 0 units.
• sops decrypt: /run/secrets/test_secret present, mode 400 root:root, 41 bytes, value begins cc-c… (matches claimed generated cc-ci-m0-…). secrets/secrets.yaml is genuinely encrypted (2× ENC[…] + sops metadata block).
• D6 leak probe (early): the decrypted plaintext value appears 0 times across all git history (git grep -F over git rev-list --all) and 0× in plaintext in secrets.yaml. No leak.

Note (not a finding; context for the M1 gate): the running system is already ahead of M0 — its closure includes docker, unit-swarm-init, and traefik units (traefik.yml, traefik-stack.yml, unit-traefik-deploy) that are not yet committed (HEAD ab839ae is swarm-only, no traefik). Expected mid-M1 churn, but the Traefik config must be committed to the repo before M1 is claimed or it fails D8 reproducibility — will check at the M1 gate.

M1 — Swarm + abra target: PASS @2026-05-26T22:20Z

Verified cold from own clone; deployed my own probe recipe via abra (not trusting the Builder's hand-test). Acceptance "a recipe deployed via abra is reachable over HTTPS at *.ci.commoninternet.net, then fully torn down leaving no volumes" + orchestrator's M1 checklist (a–d).

• (a) Real coop-cloud/traefik recipe (not hand-rolled): docker service ls → traefik_…_app (traefik:v3.6.15) + …_socket-proxy (lscr.io socket-proxy) — the canonical recipe layout, deployed via abra (scripts/deploy-proxy.sh). modules/traefik.nix is deleted.
• (b) Wildcard on web-secure + proxy overlay: static traefik.yml has web-secure: :443 (web→web-secure 301 redirect, verified live). File provider /etc/traefik/file-provider.yml: tls.certificates: [{certFile:/run/secrets/ssl_cert, keyFile:/run/secrets/ssl_key}]; swarm secrets …_ssl_cert_v1/…_ssl_key_v1 mounted (2909 B / 227 B = the pre-issued cert). My probe app advm1probe_…_app was attached to the proxy overlay.
• E2E (cold deploy): abra app new custom-html -D advm1probe.ci.commoninternet.net (forced LETS_ENCRYPT_ENV="") → deploy succeeded 🟢. Via SOCKS proxy: HTTP 200; served cert subject: CN=*.ci.commoninternet.net, SAN-matched, SSL certificate verify ok, issuer LE E8 — i.e. the pre-issued wildcard, NOT a per-host ACME cert.
• (c) No Gandi/DNS token, no ACME credential: repo (all history) clean; on host the only gandi/dns-challenge strings are commented-out recipe-template options (#GANDI_…, #SECRET_GANDIV5_…) holding no value. Active traefik env = LETS_ENCRYPT_ENV= (empty), WILDCARDS_ENABLED=1, compose.wildcard.yml. staging/production certResolvers are defined in traefik.yml (stock template) but referenced by no router; both acme.json are 0 bytes; 0 ACME lines in traefik logs. No ACME ever fires. (Hardening risk filed — see findings.)
• (d) Manual renewal documented: DECISIONS.md — operator re-issues at same paths, then abra app secret rm … ssl_cert + re-insert at bumped version; install.md "Renewed out-of-band; never ACME here."
• Teardown: abra app undeploy + volume remove → post-teardown services/containers/volumes/ secrets for the probe all 0. Also independently confirmed the Builder's cchtml1 test left 0 runtime resources (only its inert .env config file remains, harmless).

Verdict: M1 PASS. Not a hard fail on (c) — no token/credential exists and no ACME fires — but the inert ACME resolvers + test-app default LETS_ENCRYPT_ENV=production are a latent hazard that goes live when the harness deploys apps; filed as [adversary] for M4.