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review(redfix): VETO — keycloak enrollment not collision-free in warm state (F-redfix-4)
Post-reboot re-confirmation #8. New break-it probe on the two HARNESS fixes (previously
only sha-reachability checked, never content, never second-order effects).

mumble 07fc6d4: CLEAN — attempts 12->36 @5.0s = claimed 180s; all assertions unchanged,
so a dead server still FAILs. Budget widened without weakening the test.

keycloak 61211db: correct at the domain/stack layer, but its own invariant is FALSE.
canonical_domain() separates the two deployments by domain, yet warm STATE is keyed by
recipe: warmsnap.snap_dir("keycloak") is ONE slot shared by the live-warm reconciler
(warm-keycloak, stateful=True) and the newly-enrolled data-warm canonical
(warm-canon-keycloak, seeded via promote_canonical -> seed_canonical, no WARM_DOMAINS guard).

Proved by execution on cc-ci in a scratch CCCI_WARM_ROOT against the real idle canon stack:
snapshot(canon) -> snapshot(other stack) destroys the canonical known-good, and
restore(canon) raises SnapshotError. Fails closed (no cross-stack data write), but:
 1. every stateful reconciler upgrade deterministically destroys the canonical snapshot;
 2. the reconciler's rollback restore() is OUTSIDE its try/except and its snapshot->restore
    window spans deploy+wait_healthy (health_timeout 900). A sweep promote landing there makes
    the rollback raise AFTER abra.undeploy(live) -> live keycloak left undeployed = outage of
    the shared OIDC provider lasuite-*/drone depend on. Exactly the hazard canon §2.B's
    de-enrollment exception existed to prevent.
 3. prune_stale()'s documented "keycloak untouched" invariant becomes false once seeded.

Undetectable by the M2 run: /var/lib/ci-warm/keycloak/ holds only last_good (no canonical.json,
no snapshot/) vs cryptpad which has both — the promote deployed but seed_canonical never ran,
registry-advance being deferred to the operator's merge. First seed happens post-merge, unexercised.

VETO scoped to keycloak. M1 classifications and the discourse/mattermost-lts/gitea/bluesky-pds/
mumble fixes are unaffected and remain PASS. Clears when the two deployments use disjoint
warm-state paths and each restore() returns its own stack's volumes.

Node left clean: real warm root untouched, volumes intact, live keycloak 200 throughout.
2026-07-08 23:58:01 +00:00

cc-ci — Co-op Cloud recipe CI server

Comment !testme on a PR in an enrolled Co-op Cloud recipe repo and cc-ci deploys the recipe at that commit onto a real single-node Docker Swarm, runs install / upgrade / backup-restore tests (Python + Playwright) end-to-end, and reports a live, tail-able run with pass/fail back to the PR.

This repo declares the entire server as a NixOS flake and holds the test harness, the per-recipe test trees, and the docs to enroll a recipe or rebuild the box from scratch.

Status: under active autonomous construction. See machine-docs/STATUS.md for the live phase and plan.md-driven milestones in machine-docs/BACKLOG.md. Definition of Done is D1D10 (see the build plan).

Layout

flake.nix              NixOS entry point + devshells (`#cc-ci` = live Hetzner host, `#cc-ci-incus` = legacy Incus host)
nix/hosts/cc-ci/       legacy Incus VM host config (fallback / historical)
nix/hosts/cc-ci-hetzner/ live Hetzner host config
nix/modules/           drone, comment-bridge, swarm, dashboard, secrets (Nix modules)
secrets/               sops-encrypted infra secrets (cc-ci-secrets submodule)
bridge/                !testme webhook listener source
runner/                run_recipe_ci.py + shared pytest harness
dashboard/             results overview generator
tests/<recipe>/        per-recipe install/upgrade/backup tests + custom/
docs/                  install, enroll-recipe, secrets, architecture, runbook, baseline

All .nix code lives under nix/; flake.nix/flake.lock stay at the repo root. Host targets are:

  • #cc-ci = canonical live Hetzner server
  • #cc-ci-hetzner = explicit alias for the same live Hetzner server
  • #cc-ci-incus = legacy Incus VM definition only; do not use on Hetzner

Docs

  • docs/install.md — rebuild the server from scratch (D8)
  • docs/testing.md — test architecture: generic lifecycle suite + layered recipe overlays (override/extend, discovery precedence, custom install-steps hook)
  • docs/enroll-recipe.md — add a recipe under CI (D5)
  • docs/secrets.md — secret model + rotation (D6)
  • docs/architecture.md, docs/runbook.md — design + debugging failed runs
  • docs/baseline.md — bootstrap snapshot / rollback reference

Linting & formatting

The codebase is kept formatted + lint-clean by a single entrypoint, run from the pinned lint devshell so local and CI use identical tool versions:

nix develop .#lint --command bash scripts/lint.sh         # check-only (what CI runs)
nix develop .#lint --command bash scripts/lint.sh --fix   # auto-format + apply fixes

Covers Nix (nixpkgs-fmt · statix · deadnix), Python (ruff lint+format), Shell (shellcheck · shfmt), and YAML (yamllint). Config lives in ruff.toml / .yamllint.yaml; tool/strictness choices are in machine-docs/DECISIONS.md. CI enforces it: the lint step in the .drone.yml push pipeline runs the same command and fails the build on any unclean file, so keep commits clean (--fix before pushing).

Loop state (autonomous build)

The multi-agent loop state lives under machine-docs/: STATUS.md (phase/blockers), BACKLOG.md (work + adversary findings), REVIEW.md (independent verification), JOURNAL.md (build log), DECISIONS.md (architecture choices) — plus the phase-namespaced *-1b.md / *-1c.md variants. See the build plan for the two-loop Builder/Adversary protocol.

Description
Co-op Cloud recipe CI server (autonomous build)
Readme 12 MiB
Languages
Python 91.1%
Nix 5.4%
Shell 3.2%
HCL 0.3%