Files
cc-ci/JOURNAL-1c.md
autonomic-bot d8aa7578d4
All checks were successful
continuous-integration/drone/push Build is passing
1c/W4: cc-ci on ld19aj2 (byte-identical); throwaway TLS leaf-match == git cert (C4 cert proof)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 18:06:28 +01:00

20 KiB
Raw Blame History

JOURNAL — Phase 1c (Builder)

Append-only. Each entry: what I did + verifying command/output + next.

2026-05-27 — Phase 1c kickoff / orientation

Context: Phase 1 closed DONE (1c10fa5; all D1D10 Adversary-PASS, no VETO; Adversary loop terminated for Phase 1). Starting Phase 1c per plan-phase1c-full-reproducibility.md.

Did:

  • Read the phase plan in full + plan.md §6.1/§7/§9. Verified access & surveyed current state.
  • ssh cc-ci 'hostname && nixos-version && systemctl is-system-running'nixos / 24.11.20250630.50ab793 (Vicuna) / running. Healthy.
  • Surveyed secrets layout:
    • secrets/secrets.yaml holds 6 infra secrets: test_secret, drone_rpc_secret, drone_gitea_client_secret, bridge_drone_token, bridge_gitea_token, bridge_webhook_hmac.
    • .sops.yaml: recipients = &host (ssh-to-age of cc-ci ed25519 host key) + &master (off-box recovery, private at /srv/cc-ci/.sops/master-age.txt, sandbox-only).
    • modules/secrets.nix: defaultSopsFile = ../secrets/secrets.yaml, age.sshKeyPaths = ["/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key"].
    • Wildcard cert OUT-OF-BAND at cc-ci:/var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain.pem,privkey.pem} (fullchain 2909 B, privkey 227 B → privkey looks like an EC key). modules/proxy.nix reconcile reads it from there and inserts as traefik ssl_cert/ssl_key swarm secrets; treats a missing cert as FATAL (operator precondition).
    • flake.nix: nixpkgs pinned 50ab793, sops-nix pinned; single local nixosConfigurations.cc-ci.
  • Tooling note: sandbox host has NO sops/nix/age/ssh-to-age (which → only git). sops/age work must run on cc-ci (has nix + host age key) or via a sops binary fetched there with the master key.
  • Bootstrapped Phase-1c state: STATUS-1c.md, BACKLOG-1c.md, JOURNAL-1c.md (this file). REVIEW-1c.md left for the Adversary (its file per §6.1). Appended Phase-1c decisions to DECISIONS.md.

Decisions recorded (DECISIONS.md): secrets linkage = git submodule (deviates from the flake-input default — rationale: no private-repo fetch credential needed at nix-eval on every rebuild, keeps defaultSopsFile a local path = minimal change + trivially byte-identical); bootstrap key for throwaway = recovery age key via sops.age.keyFile.

Next (W2): create private recipe-maintainers/cc-ci-secrets; move secrets + wildcard cert into sops there as a submodule of the base; wire secrets.nix (cert→/var/lib/ci-certs/live via path=); prove byte-identical build + clean switch with TLS from the git cert. Then claim Gate W2.

2026-05-27 — W2 step 1: cc-ci-secrets repo created + populated (DONE)

Did:

  • Created private recipe-maintainers/cc-ci-secrets via Gitea API (bot, org admin). HTTP 201, private=True.
  • Confirmed cc-ci host SSH key → age identity == &host recipient age1h90utd…: ssh cc-ci 'nix shell nixpkgs#ssh-to-age --command ssh-to-age -i /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub' → exact match. So I can decrypt/re-encrypt on cc-ci with the host key (master stays sandbox-only).
  • Built secrets.yaml on cc-ci (script with file redirections, no key material in argv): sops -d existing 6 secrets → append wildcard_cert/wildcard_key as YAML block scalars from /var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain.pem,privkey.pem}sops -e. Verified round-trip:
    • recipients: 2 (host+master)
    • keys: test_secret, drone_rpc_secret, drone_gitea_client_secret, bridge_drone_token, bridge_gitea_token, bridge_webhook_hmac, wildcard_cert, wildcard_key
    • cert sha256 file==decrypt c1d96d61…; key sha256 file==decrypt 9ec25d00…; test_secret decrypts OK
  • Retrieved ciphertext (7219 B) to sandbox; created cc-ci-secrets repo (root secrets.yaml, own .sops.yaml w/ path_regex: secrets\.yaml$, README). Pushed to main (auth via per-command http.extraHeader; verified .git/config has NO creds). Remote lists .sops.yaml/README.md/secrets.yaml.
  • Cleaned /root/cc-ci-secrets.yaml + build script off cc-ci.

Layout decision: cc-ci-secrets has secrets.yaml at ROOT → submodule mounts at base secrets/ → base sees secrets/secrets.yaml, so defaultSopsFile = ../secrets/secrets.yaml is UNCHANGED.

Next (W2 step 2): in base repo — replace tracked secrets/ with the submodule; add wildcard_cert/wildcard_key sops secrets in secrets.nix (path= → /var/lib/ci-certs/live, + recovery keyFile); adjust proxy.nix framing; switch cc-ci to new config via nixos-rebuild switch --flake 'git+file:///root/cc-ci?submodules=1#cc-ci'; prove byte-identical + TLS-from-git-cert; then claim Gate W2. (Riskier — touches live server config; fresh iteration.)

2026-05-27 — W2a DONE + verified live; Gate W2 CLAIMED

Discovery: cc-ci's build source /root/cc-ci is NOT a git repo — it's a plain dir synced from the sandbox via tar | ssh and built as a path: flake (DECISIONS.md:126). So cc-ci's deploy needs NO submodule fetch / ?submodules=1 (the rsync'd dir already contains secrets/). The git-clone --recursive + ?submodules=1 path is only for the documented install / throwaway (W4).

Did (W2a — secrets split + cert into git, deployed to live cc-ci):

  • secrets.nix: added wildcard_cert(0444)/wildcard_key(0400) sops secrets → path=/var/lib/ci-certs/live/*.
  • proxy.nix: reframed cert as sops-from-git (not operator drop); kept FATAL guard as a decrypt-path check.
  • Base repo: git rm secrets/secrets.yaml; git submodule add cc-ci-secrets secrets (gitlink 2312f1c, .gitmodules has NO creds). Pushed f79e542 (rebased over Adversary's c360520; resolved the tracked-file→submodule transition by removing the submodule wd before rebase, repopulating after).
  • Synced to cc-ci via tar | ssh (excluded .git). nixos-rebuild build → exit 0, only 6 derivations built (sops manifest gains cert/key + proxy unit error-msg edit) → toplevel vh6vwxbl4qr9whzpwgjimhf9gn4329p8 (differs from pre-W2 m1pdvbhl… — EXPECTED: cert moved out-of-band-file → Nix-managed sops; that is C2's whole point, not drift).
  • Backed up operator cert (/root/ci-certs-operator-bak), removed the regular files, nixos-rebuild switch (detached unit ccci-w2-switch, Result=success).

Verified live:

  • sops cert decrypt: /var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain,privkey}.pem are now symlinks → /run/secrets/ wildcard_{cert,key}; content sha256 == source: c1d96d61… / 9ec25d00… (byte-identical to the original operator cert, now git-sourced).
  • systemctl is-system-running → running, 0 failed. deploy-proxy active/success.
  • Byte-identical (zero drift): nixos-rebuild build == /run/current-system == vh6vwxbl….
  • Documented git-clone path also reproduces it: fresh git clone --recursive into a temp git repo
    • nixos-rebuild build --flake 'git+file:///tmp/ccci-git?submodules=1#cc-ci'vh6vwxbl… (MATCH). Proves the install/throwaway path works and equals running.
  • Live TLS from git cert: https://ci.commoninternet.net http=200 ssl_verify=0; random probe-*.ci.commoninternet.net handshake ssl_verify=0 (404 route, expected) via gateway→cc-ci; served leaf CN=*.ci.commoninternet.net, LE issuer, valid to Aug 24 2026.

For the Adversary verifying Gate W2 cold: must init the submodule (git clone --recursive OR git submodule update --init, bot creds) then build with ?submodules=1, else secrets/ is empty. Both path: and git+submodules builds yield the same toplevel vh6vwxbl… (content-addressed).

Deferred to W3/W4 prep (NOT in W2): the recovery-key sops.age.keyFile for the throwaway VM — adding it changes the closure again, so I'll add + test it on the throwaway (safe) and re-establish byte-identical there. cc-ci stays on its proven host-key decrypt path for now.

Next: Gate W2 CLAIMED → await Adversary PASS on byte-identical + cert-in-git/TLS. Meanwhile prep W1 (resize) / W3 (throwaway VM) — read the incus skill.

2026-05-27 — W3 recon (read-only; while parked at Gate W2)

Incus skill read. b1 = 100.117.251.31:8443, project terraform-ci, mTLS certs at /srv/incus-terraform-nix-vm-creator/terraform-secrets/{terraform.crt,terraform.key}. b1 reachable via the EXISTING cc-ci proxy (curl --proxy socks5h://127.0.0.1:1055 --cert/--key -k …) — no separate tailscaled needed (skill's own 1055 proxy would collide; reuse cc-ci's).

terraform-ci instances + RAM:

  • cc-nix-test Running 6GB VM ← this IS the live cc-ci; W1 resizes 6→4 (stop→set→start, hotplug times out)
  • lichen-staging Running 4GB container (leave alone)
  • kube-base / kube-base-test Stopped 4GB VMs
  • release-runner Stopped 8GB VM Running total now = 10GB. After W1 + throwaway(4GB): 4+4+4 = 12GB ≤ 16 physical (phase-plan ~12GB doc-only guideline; terraform-ci has no enforced limits.memory). VM create = projects/incus-base Terraform template (NixOS base image, cloud-init+tailscale+nix flakes), set instance_name + limits.memory=4GB.

2026-05-27 — W1 DONE: cc-nix-test resized 6→4 GB (verified)

Gate W2 PASSED (Adversary, cold) → proceeded. No active CI run (only 5 permanent stacks). Resized via Incus API on b1 (mTLS certs through the existing 1055 proxy): PUT state stop (op Success, Stopped) → PATCH limits.memory=4GB (http 200) → PUT state start (op Success, Running). Verified after reboot:

  • SSH back in ~30s; systemctl is-system-running → running after ~104s (swarm/reconcile converge), 0 failed units.
  • free -h total 3.5Gi (≈4 GB, down from 6). All stacks 1/1 (traefik app+socket-proxy, drone, bridge, dashboard, backups).
  • Cert survived reboot via sops: /var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain,privkey}.pem still symlinks → /run/secrets/* (sops re-decrypted on cold boot). current-system still vh6vwxbl….
  • TLS: https://ci.commoninternet.net/ http=200 ssl_verify=0 (dashboard served from git cert). Running RAM now: cc-nix-test 4 + lichen-staging 4 = 8 GB; throwaway 4 → 12 GB ≤ 16 physical (guideline OK).

Next: W3 — create blank 4 GB NixOS VM in terraform-ci, provision ONLY the bootstrap (recovery) age key.

2026-05-27 — W3: throwaway VM created (booting) + W4 design notes

W3: Created ccci-throwaway in terraform-ci via the Incus REST API (curl through the 1055 proxy — terraform/nix absent on sandbox; replicated projects/incus-base/main.tf): image incus-base-vm (fp 3a0c4160), 4 GB RAM / 2 cpu / 20 GB disk (>10 GB default, to dodge cc-ci's old ENOSPC), cloud-init writes /etc/nixos/{configuration,incus-base}.nix + setup.sh + /etc/ts-auth-key (incus workspace reusable key) + /etc/ts-hostname=ccci-throwaway; runcmd setup.sh (nix-channel nixos-24.11, nixos-rebuild boot, sysrq reboot → tailscale auto-joins). ssh_authorized_keys = vm_ssh_key (I hold private) + mfowler + cc-ci-root key. CREATE+START ops Success, status Running; first boot ~4-6 min. NOTE: cc-nix-test was terraform-created (projects/cc-nix-test); my W1 API resize drifts its tfstate (reconcile or accept in W6 final-sizing).

W4 design (analysis; implement next):

  • cc-ci's hosts/cc-ci/configuration.nix pins tailscale --hostname=cc-nix-test + reads /etc/ts-auth-key, and secrets.nix decrypts ONLY via age.sshKeyPaths (host SSH key). Consequences for the throwaway:
    1. Decryption: throwaway's host SSH key is NOT a sops recipient → cc-ci config as-is can't decrypt there. W4 must add sops.age.keyFile = "/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt" and provision the recovery age key there (the ONE out-of-band secret). Open Q: does a missing keyFile abort activation on cc-ci (where the file won't exist)? If yes, also provision cc-ci's own host-derived age key at that path (no new exposure) OR keep sshKeyPaths+keyFile and confirm sops-nix tolerates the absence. Test path: add keyFile, deploy to cc-ci (rollback-safe via generations), observe.
    2. Tailnet hostname: after rebuild the throwaway re-ups as cc-nix-test → tailscale auto-suffixes the duplicate; the REAL cc-ci is accessed by IP (100.90.116.4) so it's unaffected. Verify the throwaway via its own IP (Incus state tailscale0 addr) and/or incus-agent exec (hostname-independent).
    3. Bridge side effect: throwaway's bridge would poll Gitea with the real token (fresh state ⇒ could re-trigger already-!testme'd PRs). Mitigate: run W4 when no !testme is pending; destroy promptly.
  • Adding keyFile changes the closure again (W2 byte-identical was at vh6vwxbl); re-verify after.

2026-05-27 — W3 DONE (VM reachable) + keyFile finding

W3 reachable: throwaway base boot initially failed tailscale auth — the incus-workspace .test.env key is stale ("invalid key: API key does not exist"). Fixed by writing the current TS_AUTH_KEY from /srv/cc-ci/.testenv (same tailnet taila4a0bf.ts.net) to /etc/ts-auth-key and tailscale up. VM now at 100.126.124.86; ssh -i vm_ssh_key via the 1055 proxy works → NixOS 24.11 (rev 50ab793, == cc-ci), nix 2.24 flakes, 4 GB / 20 GB (13 G free). (install.md/Adversary note: provision the live TS key, not the stale workspace one.)

keyFile finding (decisive): read sops-install-secrets main.go (sops-nix 77c423a, store hm2xjph…-source/pkgs/sops-install-secrets/main.go): when age.keyFile is set, line ~1349 os.ReadFile(AgeKeyFile) and returns a fatal error if the file is missing → activation fails. ⇒ Adding keyFile to cc-ci's config FORCES the file to exist on cc-ci. Also: sshKeyPaths reads /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key (exists on any host; non-recipient keys are simply unused), so keeping both is safe on both hosts.

W4 design (locked): secrets.nix gets sops.age.keyFile = "/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt" (keep sshKeyPaths). Provision that file = the host's bootstrap age key: on cc-ci = its host-derived age key (ssh-to-age of the host SSH key — no new secret exposure); on the throwaway = the recovery key (/srv/cc-ci/.sops/master-age.txt). cc-ci must get the file BEFORE the keyFile config deploys. Adding keyFile changes the closure (supersedes W2 vh6vwxbl) → re-verify byte-identical after.

2026-05-27 — Orchestrator guidance for C4 TLS verification (W4 Step B)

The throwaway has a NEW tailscale IP (100.126.124.86); the canonical ci.commoninternet.net gateway/DNS still points at the LIVE cc-ci, and the git cert is *.ci.commoninternet.net. So verify C4 TLS locally ON the throwaway, WITHOUT repointing the live gateway and WITHOUT changing the throwaway DOMAIN (keep DOMAIN=ci.commoninternet.net so the cert matches):

  • ssh into the throwaway; curl --resolve probe.ci.commoninternet.net:443:127.0.0.1 \ https://probe.ci.commoninternet.net/ → hits the local traefik with SNI ci.commoninternet.net.
  • Confirm the served leaf == the git cert (sha256 fullchain c1d96d61…; Adversary's leaf fingerprint 57:8D:67:9E:FE:89:…:B8:A6). That proves the rebuilt system serves the git-sourced cert reproducibly.
  • Do NOT use ci2 for the TLS test (no *.ci2 cert → would mismatch). Operator wired ci2.commoninternet.net + *.ci2 → 100.126.124.86 for plain reachability only (not needed for TLS).
  • DNS/gateway/cert are documented external INSTANCE preconditions; C4 proves the VM rebuilds from git
    • the single bootstrap age key. Don't skip/fake the TLS check.

2026-05-27 — W4 Step A DONE + Step B launched (throwaway rebuild in flight)

Step A (cc-ci → final keyFile config): provisioned cc-ci /var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt = host-derived age key (pub == age1h90utd… == &host recipient, verified via age-keygen -y). Added sops.age.keyFile to secrets.nix (9cc6788), synced, nixos-rebuild buildizsmiajw… (only manifest+system rebuilt), switched (unit ccci-w4a-switch success). Verified: system running 0 failed, byte-identical build==running==izsmiajw… (ZERO DRIFT), cert still sha256 c1d96d61…. So cc-ci activates cleanly with keyFile. NOTE: toplevel evolved vh6vwxbl (W2) → izsmiajw (final, +keyFile); the published repo now builds to izsmiajw==running — this is the form the Adversary re-verifies for C4/DONE.

Step B (throwaway live rebuild — IN FLIGHT):

  • Provisioned throwaway /var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt = recovery key (via stdin; pub == age1cmk26… == &master recipient, verified) — the ONE out-of-band secret.
  • git clone --recursive base (bot creds via http.extraHeader, the "given the repos" provisioning) → /root/cc-ci, submodule secrets→2312f1c, secrets.yaml ENC. Confirmed clone has age.keyFile line.
  • Launched nixos-rebuild switch --flake 'git+file:///root/cc-ci?submodules=1#cc-ci' as detached unit ccci-rebuild (survives the tailscale re-up when cc-ci config activates). Monitoring via incus-agent exec (vsock — survives network restart). Expect 10-30 min (builds sops-install-secrets/abra/etc).

C4/W5 standard (Adversary dd710a6 == orchestrator guidance): keep DOMAIN=ci.commoninternet.net, verify TLS locally on the VM via curl --resolve …:443:127.0.0.1 (SNI ci.commoninternet.net), served leaf fingerprint must == git cert leaf 57:8D:67:9E:…:B8:A6; oneshots converge; only age key out-of-band.

2026-05-27 — W4 Step B: throwaway rebuilt; concurrent-abra race found + fixed

Throwaway rebuild result (pre-fix config, clone @dd710a6): nixos-rebuild switch BUILD succeeded (2.8 G peak RAM < 4 GB, 11.5 min CPU) → toplevel izsmiajw… == cc-ci's running system (blank VM reproduces cc-ci byte-for-byte from git + the bootstrap age key). sops cert decrypted via the RECOVERY key: /var/lib/ci-certs/live/{fullchain,privkey}.pem → /run/secrets/*, sha256 c1d96d61… (match). swarm-init + docker active (node Ready/Leader). BUT activation reported "error(s) while switching": deploy-proxy + deploy-drone FAILED → system degraded.

Root cause: the abra reconcilers (proxy/drone/bridge/dashboard/backupbot) are all wantedBy multi-user.target; drone/bridge/dashboard were after deploy-proxy but concurrent with each other, and backupbot concurrent with proxy. On a FRESH ~/.abra they race on catalogue/recipe init → fast failures. Confirmed: abra recipe fetch traefik works fine alone (rc=0); re-running the oneshots sequentially (systemctl restart deploy-proxy; …drone; …bridge; …dashboard; …backupbot) → ALL success, system running, 0 failed, all 6 stacks 1/1 (traefik app+socket-proxy, drone, bridge, dashboard, backups) — identical to cc-ci.

Fix (7563d47): serialize the chain via ordering-only after: proxy → drone → bridge → dashboard → backupbot (bridge after drone, dashboard after bridge, backupbot after dashboard). So a single nixos-rebuild switch on a blank host converges with no concurrent abra. New toplevel ld19aj2…. Deploying to cc-ci (reconcilers already deployed there ⇒ serial no-op re-runs) + re-verify byte-identical, then recreate the throwaway FRESH to prove single-switch convergence (authoritative C4; mirrors the Adversary's W5 cold test).

This is the LAST planned config change before W4 completes (config stable ld19aj2 thereafter).

2026-05-27 — W4: cc-ci on serialized config (ld19aj2) + throwaway TLS leaf-match PASS

  • cc-ci switched to serialized config: systemctl is-system-running=running, byte-identical build==running==ld19aj2dcrjm6jarq1k6rvhc0zww34qq (ZERO DRIFT), 6 stacks.
  • Throwaway local TLS (C4 cert proof): on the rebuilt throwaway (IP 100.126.124.86), curl --resolve probe.ci.commoninternet.net:443:127.0.0.1 → http=404 (no route, expected) ssl_verify=0. Served leaf sha256 fingerprint == git-cert leaf: 57:8D:67:9E:FE:89:D5:FB:43:2E:2A:02:D6:A6:BA:F4:9B:98:1A:78:4A:6C:6A:85:DB:F6:A2:81:61:A6:B8:A6 (== Adversary reference). Full chain of custody: git sops → recovery-key decrypt → /var/lib/ci-certs/ live → traefik swarm secret → served leaf. The rebuilt host serves the git-sourced cert.

Next: recreate throwaway FRESH with fixed config to prove SINGLE nixos-rebuild switch converges (0 failed).